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 Abstract 
Iran’s nuclear programme is the object of much scepticism from many of the world’s great 
powers, which has led the EU, the US and the UN to impose a series of economic sanctions on 
Iran. A diplomatic solution has so far been prioritised, in the negotiations between Iran and an 
EU/EU-3+3 constellation. This project seeks to determine which role the EU has had in the 
negotiations surrounding Iran’s nuclear programme. We examine how the interests of the EU-3 
may influence the EU during the negotiations. The rationale behind the EU’s sanctions is then 
determined, followed by an examination of the US, Russia and Chinese influence on the EU, as 
well as the diplomatic approach of the EU. Subsequently, the findings in the analysis provide the 
basis for a discussion of different roles the EU may carve out for themselves in the negotiations. 
We conclude that the role of the EU is a balance between coordinating the actors policies, 
facilitate the diplomatic framework, mediate between conflictual actors, while maintain a strong 
political role with the utilisation of economic sanctions. 
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1. Introduction 
1.1. Problem Area 
Since the 1950’s, Iran has been developing a nuclear programme. This was done in close 
cooperation with the US, but after the 1979 Islamic revolution, there has been great uncertainty 
about Iran’s intentions. This uncertainty has caused the UN, the US and the EU to impose 
economic sanctions, in an attempt to coerce Iran into fulfilling certain conditions, that may 
assure the rest of the world, that Iran’s nuclear programme has a solely peaceful purpose (Meier, 
2013:1-5). The role of the EU in international affairs is highly debated, especially in high-
sensitive areas, as in the case of the negotiations on Iran’s nuclear programme. The negotiations 
have been the most ambitious, in the field of non-proliferation, ever taken by the EU. The EU 
has invested a large amount of political will and economic resources, in the attempt to reach a 
solution (Kienzle, 2013:44-45). The ultimate goal is to reach a long-term agreement that ensures 
an exclusively peaceful use of nuclear power, in agreement with the non-proliferation treaty 
(EEAS, 2015A). Despite of this, the specific role of the EU in the negotiations divides scholars, 
in a debate of whether they have had a significant role or simply been a bystander. 
In the negotiations of Iran’s nuclear programme, the media tend to view the EU and the US as a 
collective global actor, labelled “The West” (The New York Times 2015; The Wall Street 
Journal, 2015; Reuters, 2015). American foreign policy expert Robert Kagan (2004) argues that 
Americans are from Mars and Europeans from Venus, indicating that the two actors have 
fundamentally different strategies, due to their cultural differences. Americans are usually 
seeking an elimination of the problem, and divides actors into good and evil, whereas Europeans 
are more patient and accepts the process and complexity of conflicts. Furthermore, he argues that 
Americans are more eager to use military force, whereas the Europeans are more likely to opt for 
diplomacy (Kagan, 2004:3-4). The argument from Kagan hereby opposes the media's 
generalisation when labelling the EU and the US in the negotiations as “The West”. Due to its 
history, norms, institutions and political system, we argue that the EU acts as a very different 
foreign policy actor than the US, and that it therefore should be perceived as an independent 
actor in the negotiations with Iran. 
In our initial research, we have come across the assumption that the US has been the primary and 
most prominent actor in the negotiations with Iran. According to Janne Bjerre Christensen, an 
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expert on international security with a focus on Iran, the EU does not act independently, but 
rather they just follows the American strategy. This means that the Iranian government 
negotiates directly with the US, as it is in any case the Americans that call the shots (Appendix 
1:3). Joseph Bahout, an expert on the political developments in the Middle East, supports this 
opinion. He states that it is first and foremost the Americans that have controlled the negotiations 
(Appendix 4:3). While these two scholars point to the US as the dominant actor in the 
negotiations, other scholars oppose this position. Riccardo Alcaro, an expert on security relations 
and expert on the foreign policy of the EU Aniseh Tabrizi (2014) argue, that the EU, during the 
last 10 years, has been the main actor in the negotiations, because it was the EU that facilitated 
the multilateral negotiations. They claim that, since 2005, the US has gradually stolen the 
spotlight in the negotiation process with Iran. During the nuclear issue, several sanctions against 
Iran have been led by the US, who also increased their military movement in the area around 
Iran. As the EU does not posses the same military capabilities as the US, and at the same time it 
is not their preferred conflict management tool, they have not been able to keep the led in the 
nuclear issue (Alcaro & Tabrizi, 2014:15-18). Kienzle (2013) nuances this approach by stating 
that because the US cut their diplomatic connections with the Iranian government in 1980, the 
EU-3, consisting of Germany, France and the United Kingdom (UK), has been able to take the 
lead in the negotiations (Kienzle, 2013:44). Kienzle therefore allocates the EU a larger role than 
Alcaro and Tabrizi. Emmanuel Blanc underpins this by arguing that the EU has not only played a 
coordinating and mediating role, but has through economic sanctions and coercive diplomacy 
controlled the negotiations and been more enthusiastic to reach an agreement with Iran than the 
US, Russia or China (Blanc, 2014:1-3). Furthermore, Blanc argues that the EU has prevented 
Israel, with support from the US, from conducting a military strike on Iran (Blanc, 2014:22). 
While Blanc, Kienzle, Alcaro and Tabrizi differ in their arguments and approaches, they all 
reject the claim that the EU has not played an important role in the negotiations. This challenges 
the assumption of the EU as a bystander for a comprehensive US strategy. 
 
The different perspectives make it difficult to determine what kind of role the EU has played in 
the nuclear negotiations. We argue, that it is necessary to examine the interest, norms and values 
of the EU-3, which could have an impact on how the EU has acted in the negotiations. 
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Furthermore, Iran is an important and complex actor in the Middle East, and due to this 
importance we find it necessary to focus on interests in a regional context (Adebahr, Otte & 
Tocci, 2015). Iran has a very strategic and important geographic position, and they could 
potentially become an important partner, for the EU, when dealing with Russia, Asia and the 
Middle East in terms of regional stability and cooperation (Adebahr, Otte & Tocci, 2015). The 
relationships between the EU-3 countries and Iran, are not merely based on the negotiations of 
the nuclear programme, but also consist of historical relations. 
By looking at how the relationships between the EU-3 countries and Iran influence the actions of 
the EU in the negotiations, and at the same time how the EU defines themselves as an actor, we 
can thereby determine the role of the EU in the negotiations. 
 
1.2. Problem Formulation 
What role has the EU had in managing the non-proliferation of nuclear weapons in Iran? 
- and to which degree is this based on the individual interests of the EU-3 in Iran? 
 
Our problem formulation is focused on two aspects. First of all, we want to analyse what role the 
EU has had in the negotiations of Iran’s nuclear programme. Secondly, due to the very complex 
nature of the EU as an actor, we aim to provide a snapshot of how the interests of the EU-3 may 
influence the role of the EU as a global actor, exemplified by the negotiations on Iran’s nuclear 
programme. Focusing on the EU-3 brings about the different interests, norms and values that 
member states may have, and seek to project to the EU. This entails economic, historical, 
political and cultural factors. Furthermore, we argue that when the EU tries to carve out their role 
as a global actor, they tend to do this in relation to other major actors. In the case of the 
negotiations regarding Iran’s nuclear programme, the actions of the EU will be analysed in 
contrast to the other important actors in the negotiations. 
We answer our problem formulation by examining the different interests of the EU-3, and how 
they may have affected the EU. Then, we explain what kind of an actor the EU has attempted to 
be during the negotiations. This is done by analysing the nature of the EU’s foreign policy, and 
then analysing the rational basis of the sanctions imposed on Iran. Lastly, we examine the EU’s 
diplomatic approach of the EU in the nuclear talks. 
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Our findings in the analysis, regarding the interests of the EU-3, the actions of the EU in relation 
to Iran and their diplomatic efforts during the negotiations, will be summed up and discussed. 
The discussion will tie our findings together, and debate the role of the EU in the Iranian nuclear 
negotiations. 
 
1.3. Interests as a Concept 
Interests as a concept in international relations is disputed among different scholars. Realist 
scholar Hans Morgenthau (1948) defined interests as a state’s means to secure its goal of 
survival (Jackson & Sørensen, 2013:75). Interests are thereby detached from individual or 
domestic ideas of morality, and only concern state’s ability to achieve security, stability, order, 
and power to secure its sovereignty (Jackson & Sørensen, 2013:73-76). 
Opposite this view, liberal scholars argue that states mainly have common interests based on 
peaceful coexistence, economic interdependence, development and prosperity (Jackson & 
Sørensen, 2013:105-113). Liberalists perceive interests as shaped not only by the state, but also 
by individuals, civil society organisations and global institutions. Liberal republican scholar 
Bruce Russett (1993) claims that democracies have more common interests because of shared 
norms in conflict management, peacekeeping and economic cooperation (Jackson & Sørensen, 
2013:105-113). 
Challenging liberal and realist assumptions, the constructivist scholar Alexander Wendt (1992) 
argues that interests are not material based, but consist of social values and norms (Jackson & 
Sørensen, 2013:209-214). Interests are primarily determined by a set of ideas and thoughts, 
which means that material powers, such as military force or economic trade, are secondary 
factors. Constructivism thereby rejects both liberals and realists assumption of interests as 
something objective that can be materialised in military or economic power. Interests are 
according to constructivists perceived as relational and shaped by history, culture, norms and 
values, which then have an effect on how states materialise its power (Jackson & Sørensen, 
2013:213). 
 
We argue that the interests of the EU consist of both social and material factors. It is thereby 
difficult to distinguish between the economic power and normative power of the EU, when they 
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are using sanctions as an instrument. Furthermore, defining the interests of the EU becomes even 
more complex, because they are comprised of the interests of the member states, and the interests 
of the EU as a supranational institution. We see the involvement of the EU in Iran’s nuclear 
programme as an interesting case, because it is an example of the EU conducting foreign policy 
with a united front, based on a common interest of the EU. We therefore argue, that interests in 
this case cannot be reduced to a power struggle, a fight for democracy, or an economic 
interdependence, as a realist or liberal assumption would highlight. 
The relation between the EU and Iran goes beyond the current negotiations, and therefore the 
interests should be analysed in a comprehensive perspective that includes historical, cultural and 
normative factors. It is, however, also necessary to analyse the interests from a material and 
power perspective, because norms and values cannot solely explain the role of the EU in the 
negotiations. 
A liberal assumption is that democratic countries share the same norms in conflict management, 
which in turn is determining for those common interests of the countries. We are, however, 
sceptical towards this assumption, and distinguish between the norms of the US and the EU in 
conflict management, even though they are both democratic countries. We argue that an actor’s 
interests, might be influenced by same ideas, but in practice can be executed and implemented 
very differently in conflict management, which is the case with the US and the EU’s relationship. 
For this project, interests are perceived as a dualistic relationship between material factors and 
norms. Thereby we follow a constructivist approach to interests as constituted by a range of 
social and relational believes, which determines how material powers and diplomacy are being 
utilized in conflict management. Our focus is therefore on the EU-3’s interests in Iran, and how 
this reflects the EU’s role in the negotiations. These interests include the EU-3’s economic 
relations with Iran, regional security, power structures, alliances in the Middle East and historical 
factors, which together with the EU’s own norms and values determines their action. 
 
1.4. Defining the Actors 
The EU is a very complex actor, as it may act as one entity, 28 different member states, the EU-3 
and the High Representative. The interconnectedness of these actors, in the negotiations, creates 
some difficulties when analysing the role of the EU. When examine the role of the EU, it is also 
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necessary to include the other actors in the negotiations: The US, Germany, France, the UK, 
Russia, China and the UN, in order to comprehend the complexity of the negotiations. This 
section will define the actors involved in the negotiations, and how they are included in this 
project. 
 
An actor in the field of international relations can be defined in various different ways. 
International relations theory is traditionally based on how sovereign states act and react in the 
international system (Bretherton & Vogler, 2006:14). The EU can therefore be very difficult to 
define through the international relation theories, because it is not characterized as a state, or as 
an intergovernmental institution. The most common way to describe the EU is that it is an actor 
sui generis (Bretherton & Vogler, 2006:34). The EU is a union that is still under development, 
and their role as an actor changes with the implementation of each new treaty, which makes it 
harder to determine its actorness. In this project, we perceive the EU as an actor, as it is an entity 
that is capable of formulating and acting upon decisions (Bretherton & Vogler, 2006:33). 
 
When defining the EU as an actor in the negotiation process, we chose to distinguish between the 
EU-3 and the EU as different, though interdependent actors. 
In this case, the EU been represented through the High Representative of the Union for Foreign 
Affairs and Security Policy (HR) and her staff. The HR works on behalf of the member states 
through the Council and is the EU’s representative in foreign affairs (EEAS, 2014A). In our 
project, we will mainly focus on Catherine Asthon, who was the HR from 2009-2014 and later 
became the special advisor for the negotiation process, as well as Frederica Mogherini, who is 
the current HR (EEAS, 2014A). The role of the HR in the EU, was redefined with the 
implementation of the Lisbon Treaty in 2009, affected the diplomatic approach of the EU 
towards Iran. There has, however, been critique of the lack of coherence and coordination 
between the HR, the EU Council President, and the member states (Lehne, 2015). Another 
critique is the lack of real political power from the HR to negotiate in high-level politics 
(Rettman, 2014). These assumptions are challenged by scholars who believes that Catherine 
Ashton, as the HR, have played an important part in the negotiations, by extensively 
coordinating and including all the member states, while negotiating with Iran (Meier, 2013:4). 
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Ashton also managed to contribute with a more personal profile to EU’s diplomacy, by engaging 
directly with involved Iranian officials, more times than the normal procedure prescribes 
(Howorth, 2014:17). The role of the HR also became important when large member states, such 
as Portugal, Spain and Italy, began to question the EU-3’s legitimacy as represents for the whole 
EU’s common interests (Meier, 2013:4). 
In relation to this, we argue that the HR gained more legitimacy as a negotiator, by expanding 
the negotiations from the EU-3 to the EU/EU-3 framework. This constellation incorporated the 
entire EU in the negotiations, enabling the member states to exercise influence, through the EU 
and the HR. Furthermore, we argue that the inclusion of the HR in the negotiations strengthens 
the coordination between the EU and the EU-3. This does not reduce the influence of the EU-3, 
but rather complements their interests, as they gain influence through both the HR and their own 
ministers of foreign affairs. There are, however, some complications with the double 
representation of the EU-3 in the negotiations. All three states are influential members of the EU, 
and are therefore able to affect how the HR acts in the negotiations. This entails that the HR may 
act on behalf of the EU-3, and at the same time against them in the negotiations. Moreover, 
Catherine Ashton’s identity as a Brit may have affected her and the UK’s actions, in the 
negotiations. Based on the previous section, we argue that the HR has acted as a coordinator and 
mediator in the negotiations, while also securing legitimacy and internal coherence among the 
member states of the EU. 
The negotiations consist of other actors than the EU and the EU-3 who needs to be taken into 
consideration when we are analysing the role of the EU. The US has a different approach to 
foreign policy than the EU, which the EU has to take into consideration when they plan their 
actions (Kagan, 2004:3-4). Several of the sanctions on Iran have been implemented through the 
UN, with the Security Council as the most prominent actor. We see the sanctions as an important 
tool for the negotiators, especially the EU. The UN, however, will not be analysed in this project, 
as we believe they have constituted a framework for the sanctions, and not been an autonomous 
actor. The EU as a global actor needs to take the position of China and Russia into consideration 
as they have influence on the UN sanctions through their permanent seats in the UN Security 
Council. 
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As mentioned in the introduction the actors that negotiate with Iran are sometimes labelled “The 
West”. There are several other names for the actors which all indicate a different focus. The 
EU/EU-3+3 is the most common term used by the EU itself. It is the only term, where the EU is 
specifically mentioned, and thus, it contributes to the recognition the EU as an actor in the 
negotiations. The two most common used terms is the P5+1 and the EU-3+3. Neither of the 
terms refers directly to the EU as an independent actor. The P5+1 is focused on the five 
permanent members of UN’s Security Council plus Germany. That term is centred on the UN 
and their role as an international institution. The EU-3+3 has its main focus on the EU, but only 
through the three large and influential countries, Germany, France and the United Kingdom. It is 
quite remarkable that the Eurocentric term does not recognise the EU as an independent actor, 
especially when the HR has, as earlier stated, been an important part of the negotiations.  
We choose to use the term EU/EU-3+3 in this project when referring to all the actors in the 
negotiation process with Iran, because it is the only term that acknowledges the EU as an 
independent actor and at the same time includes the other major actors. 
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2. Methodology 
2.1. Delimitation 
In order to determine the role of the EU when dealing with Iran’s nuclear programme, one of our 
focuses is on the interests of the EU-3. As we focus on the interests of France, Germany and the 
UK, we delimit ourselves from analysing the EU as a unit consisting of 28 member states. 
Instead we argue that the EU is an independent actor in the negotiations, while also being heavily 
influenced by the EU-3, as will be discussed in our analysis. In this project, the EU is mainly 
represented by the HR. We will not analyse the institutions inside the EU, and how they affect 
the decisions in relation to the nuclear negotiations with Iran. This means that we do not examine 
civil servants or politicians, involved in the external affairs of the EU, but instead, we limit 
ourselves to the HR. 
We delimit the project from the Iranian perspective on the nuclear issue. This includes the 
internal power struggles and policy-processes of the Iranian government. Even though these 
factors potentially affect the negotiations and agreements between the EU and Iran, our primary 
focus is the EU, and their interests and actions in relation to Iran. 
We include a historical overview of the interactions between the EU-3 and Iran in order to 
comprehend the current context of the nuclear issue. The main focus in our analysis is the events 
between 2003 and 2015, since this is when the nuclear talks started between the EU and Iran. 
The historical account is mainly included in order to determine what interests the EU-3 has had 
in Iran, and how previous events and relations have influenced the interest that the EU-3 has 
brought in to the EU. The US, Russia and China are included in order to determine how their 
actions in the negotiations, affects and shapes the role of the EU in the negotiations. Therefore 
we delimit ourselves from the US, Russia and China’s own foreign policy strategy towards the 
Middle East.  
 
2.2. Bias 
When writing this project, we are aware of certain bias of the group members, which may affect 
our analysis. We are all predisposed, to a certain degree, to the EU playing an important role in 
the Iran negotiations, and in foreign affairs in general. This is most likely due to our education, 
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which involves many subjects centred on the EU. The fact that we are EU citizen ourselves, and 
to some extend identify ourselves in that way, also plays a part in this. 
There is also a degree of scepticism towards the EU-3 uploading their preferences to the EU. Our 
common understanding of the EU as something supranational, and not just an interstate political 
arena, entails that we are sceptical of actions that are not an expression of a common European 
interest. 
 
2.3. Empirical choices and challenges 
The empirical information gathered and analysed in this project is primarily qualitative data, 
gathered in a thorough research of the existing academic work, official statements and interviews 
with experts. 
We conducted an exhaustive search for interview persons to supplement our findings from the 
existing academic work in the field, to provide us with first-hand knowledge about the 
negotiation process. We are aware that the many different actors involved in the conflict, besides 
the EU, adds a high degree of complexity to the issue. Due to this complexity, we would argue 
that our subject is very context dependent, and the role of the EU as an actor is not static. In 
order to fully comprehend the context and depth of our subject, we aimed to conduct interviews 
with EU officials and experts in the field. We contacted several officials in the EU-system, both 
politicians and civil servants. In most of the cases, our enquiries unfortunately remained 
unanswered. Those who did respond were reached over the phone, mostly through their 
secretaries. They all answered that they would get back to us soon, however, never happened. It 
was not until our supervisor contacted every person on our list for us, that we got an answer. We 
were to understand that, due to the delicate manner of the conflict, as well as the fact that a 
comprehensive deal on the nuclear programme is still a work in progress, it is not possible for 
EU official to comment on the matter. This sensitivity regarding the issue was first of all 
expressed directly to us by Lead Spokesperson Catherine Ray, from the European External 
Action Service (EEAS), via email to our supervisor (Appendix 5). It was also expressed by 
Catherine Ashton, in a speech to the European Parliament (EEAS, 2014B), and further reflected 
on by Cornelius Adebahr, from the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, commenting 
on the secretive nature of the negotiations: “Hence, the EEAS team has kept their cards very 
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close to their chests. While this is understandable in the context of the negotiations, it means that 
half a dozen people close to the high representative claim any issue pertaining to Iran as theirs” 
(Adebahr, 2014). 
First hand information from the EU officials would provide us with information on the different 
propositions, demands and interests at stake, both those of the EU, represented by the HR, and 
those of the EU-3 negotiators. The lack of cooperation from the EU, however, means that our 
data has been obtained through second hand sources, such as reports, books and dissertations. 
The only first hand data from the EU that we were able to gather was official statements and 
strategies from public EU material. This especially had an impact on our analysis of the 
diplomatic approach of the EU, as this is conducted largely as a theoretical debate, between 
different positions of scholars in the field. 
 
2.4. Interviews 
At an early stage of the project, we contacted Peter Viggo Jakobsen from The Royal Danish 
Defense College, to be inspired by his thoughts about the complexity of the Iranian nuclear 
negotiation, which helped us in the process of creating the framework for our project. 
We conducted an interview with Janne Bjerre Christensen, attached as appendix 1, from The 
Danish Institute of International Studies (DIIS), an expert on Iranian internal and external policy, 
who has published several reports concerning the economic sanctions against Iran. The interview 
provided us with insight on the different actors involved, and the power relations between the 
EU, the US and Iran. Our last interview was with Joseph Bahout from the Carnegie Endowment 
for International Peace, attached as appendix 4. Bahout is an expert on the political developments 
in the Middle East, and a former consultant at the French foreign ministry, which means that he 
has extensive knowledge of the French diplomatic milieu. He provided us with insight on the 
interests of the EU-3, and in particular France. 
Our interviews have all been conducted in a semi-structured manner. This means that we 
structured a series of open questions, prior to the interview, but in general were interested in 
letting the interviewee lead the conversation where he or she were going. The interviews with 
Janne Bjerre Christensen and Joseph Bahout were subsequently transcribed. 
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3. Theoretical framework 
In order to examine what role the EU has had in the negotiations on Iran’s nuclear programme, 
we found it necessary to comprise a theoretical framework, consisting primarily of two theories. 
Each theory helps us understand a specific aspect of the subject. Europeanization allows us to 
analyse how the interests of the EU-3 have affected the decisions of the EU in the negotiations. 
Neta Crawford and Audie Klotz (1999) provide us with theoretical knowledge, in order to 
specify the role of the EU, in relation to Iran, by categorising the EU’s sanctions. 
 
3.1. Europeanization 
Europeanization explains the constant interaction between the EU and its member states, through 
the bottom up concept of uploading of preferences and norms, and the top-down concept of 
downloading of ideas, rules, practices and strategies (Borzel & Panke, 2009:406). 
Europeanization aims to comprehend the complex nature of European policy making, through a 
theoretical framework in which the policy-process is addressed (Flers & Müller, 2010:1-2). With 
this framework, we observe which actors are capable, through their own preferences and power, 
to change and shape the policies of the EU (Borzel & Panke, 2009:407). The foundation of the 
concept is, that the foreign policies of the member states and the EU have become increasingly 
interconnected. This is due to a greater institutionalisation of European foreign policy, which has 
enabled a process of uploading and downloading (Flers & Müller, 2010:6). 
In this project, Europeanization is included as a conceptual analytical framework in order to 
comprehend the interests of the EU-3 in Iran, and how they affect the role of the EU in the 
negotiations. 
 
3.1.1. Key concepts of Europeanization 
Nicole Alecu de Flers and Patrick Müller (2010) describe the concept of uploading as member 
states’ attempt to spread own national policy preferences and interests to the EU level. 
Furthermore, the uploading tool is attractive because multilateral actions are more efficient, and 
thus, through the concept of politics of scale, the EU member states are able to achieve greater 
foreign policy goals (Flers & Müller, 2010:9). Member states are also able to project potential 
policy failure to the EU level, meaning that uploading of interests becomes more attractive in 
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controversial policy areas, as a mean to prevent domestic consequences The use of tools such as 
diplomacy, economic sanctions and military actions are more attractive to conduct at the EU 
level, as they are often related to such sensitive areas (Flers & Müller, 2010:9). This gives the 
EU-3 potential influence on how the EU has acted in the negotiations, as the EU-3 may use the 
EU to promote their own interests, in order to gain more power and legitimacy through collective 
actions, as well as to avoid facing a potential failure alone. 
Another important factor in Europeanization is the concept of normative suasion, where member 
states seek to change the ideas and interests of other member states (Flers & Müller, 2010:11).  
Normative suasion is an attractive strategy for member states to project their interests to the EU-
level, because of the consensus culture regarding decision making in the EU, based on common 
interests. This creates a changeable policy process where member states aim to change other 
member states interests and norms, in order to shape a common interests at EU-level (Flers & 
Müller, 2010:11). 
 
Following this, Lorena Ruano and Jean Monnet Chair (2011) argue that the willingness of the 
member states to upload preferences are determined by interests and power, which are also 
changeable variables. Interests are measured by the national states political goals, economic 
situation and social factors. Power is measured by the amount of member states, which shares the 
same interests, or by the existence of a group of states with opposing interests (Ruano & Chair, 
2011:18). 
 
The downloading process is the member states’ adoption of ideas, practices and rules from the 
EU level. The member states download the preferences of the EU, either because they are 
convinced it is in their interest, or because they are pressured to do so by the EU (Flers & Müller, 
2010:12). The downloading processes will likely cause domestic change in the institutions, 
policy-processes and norms of the member states, and it can directly affect the national laws 
(Borzel & Panke, 2009:406). It is, however, important to notice that downloading preferences 
from the EU can have very different outcome and consequences, depending on the member state. 
Domestic factors, such as the size of the state, its foreign relations, national identity, historical 
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relations or long-term strategic goals, makes it hard to predict the Europeanization process (Flers 
& Müller, 2010:12). 
The whole process is dialectical, in the sense that the EU-3 uploads their interests to the EU, 
while they also download collective EU interests. This means that the interests of one EU-3 
country could, through the EU, eventually become a collective interest of the whole EU-3. By 
focusing at the EU-3, we can also analyse whether they affect each other directly through 
normative suasion, so the interests of one EU-3 country becomes the interests of another. 
Europeanization as a conceptual framework should not be understood as an inter-governmental 
theory with inter-state bargaining as the main focus. Europeanization has a normative aspect 
through the emergence of common interests and values. Uploading of preferences is not a matter 
of interstate bargaining in a traditional sense, but rather a socialisation process, where member 
states attempt to shape a common norm inside the EU, in order to change the policy procedure 
for its own benefits (Flers & Müller, 2010:10). 
When using Europeanization as an analytical framework, it requires taking several dependent 
variables into account. Political changes at the national level, institutional changes at a regional 
level and global external changes are all taken into account when we analyse the dialectical 
relationship between the EU-3 and the EU, in the negotiations (Flers & Müller, 2010:5). 
 
An intergovernmental critic of Europeanization is that the socialization process that links the 
uploading and downloading process together is exaggerated and does not take material factors 
into account (Ruano & Chair, 2011:8). This is a fundamental aspect of the critique that is also 
present in the critique points reflected on here.  
As Europeanization aims to determine how other variables at the national, regional or global 
level, affects the policy process, it becomes difficult to determine which variables are more likely 
to change the process than others. Europeanization does not have specific settings on which 
variables to choose, it therefore entails that the researcher has decide which variables have been 
most influential, increasing the possibility of bias in the research. 
The socialization process makes it hard to distinguish between an uploading and downloading 
process, as they are interrelated. This leaves the researcher with a great amount of autonomy, 
which could affect the reliability of the research.  
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As Europeanization aims to capture both rational and constructivist approaches of policy 
making, it creates some ontological challenges, which needs constantly to be reflected and 
discussed while analysing. By capturing both assumptions in Europeanization, it becomes 
difficult to determine the comparative relationship between the material and normative factors in 
the policy process. This is also a consequences of Europeanization not being a classic IR theory 
that explains actors behaviour in foreign affairs, but rather it is an analytical framework that 
seeks to capture a complex foreign policy process.  
 
3.2. Sanction Theory - Four Models of Rationale 
The key argument of Neta Crawford and Audie Klotz (1999) is that sanctions are 
multidimensional and more complex than commonly perceived by most academic scholars, 
politicians and the media (Crawford & Klotz, 1999:26). There are four different models of 
influence, when an actor chooses to use sanctions as a policy tool: Compellence, Normative 
communication, Resource denial and Political fracture. These four models of influence can also 
be combined in a multidimensional policy (Crawford & Klotz, 1999:27). 
 
Even though the theoretical framework was generated in 1999 and the sanction literature, as well 
as the empirical data has developed since, we argue that the framework is still relevant and 
useful in our case. The framework focuses on the rationale behind the sanctions, which is the 
aspect of the EU’s sanctions we wish to analyse. Furthermore, the four models of influence 
provide us with the ability to analyse how the rationale behind the sanctions reflects the interests 
of the EU-3. 
 
The first model of influence is compellence. The coercer imposes sanctions through a cost 
benefit approach that aims to make the costs higher than the benefits, if the country pursues its 
policy. Sanctions need to be comprehensive, credible and persistent in order to succeed. 
Furthermore, it is necessary to steadily increase the costs, or decrease the benefits for the targets 
policy. The compellence model is more attractive to exercise if the targeted country is economic 
or militarily dependent of either the coercing country, or the international society (Crawford & 
Klotz, 1999:26). 
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The second model of influence is normative communication. The assumption is, that the targeted 
country’s decision makers and population are receptive to normative arguments. The coercer 
imposes sanctions if an international recognised norm is being violated, and this legitimises the 
sanctions. The effectiveness of sanctions is based on the symbolic consequences of being 
isolated from the international society, and they are strengthened further if the coercer has 
significant costs by imposing them (Crawford & Klotz, 1999:28). 
The third model is resource denial. This implies that decision makers and the population of the 
targeted country are non-receptive to norm-based arguments, as they are rational actors. In order 
to coerce them, it is necessary to prevent the targeted country from exercising the unwanted 
policy. This is done by imposing targeted sanctions on the resources necessary to achieve the 
policy goal. Successful sanctions depend on the targeted countries global economic or military 
dependence and the ability of the coercer to cut the target off from resources, through embargos 
(Crawford & Klotz, 1999:28). 
The last model of influence is political fracture. This rationale is based on the idea that sanctions 
should affect all parts of the society, in order to compel the target. This includes governmental 
institutions, civil society groups, ethnic or religious minorities and political parties. Social and 
political factors are more important than material factors, because the state’s legitimacy stems 
from the population. Sanctions should therefore be used as an instrument to influence internal 
politics of the targeted country, in order to destabilise the government and create unrest or 
regime change (Crawford & Klotz, 1999:28). 
When using Crawford and Klotz framework for analysing sanctions, we acknowledge that the 
rationale behind the EU sanctions is connected with the role that the EU wants to take. Therefore 
Crawford and Klotz’ four models of influence cannot explain the rationale in its entirety, but 
instead we use it in relation to our other theories, which explain the other aspects of the EU’s 
role. 
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4. Overview 
This section describes the historical development of the nuclear programme and Iran as a 
regional actor, in order to provide an overview of the issue at hand. 
 
4.1. The Iranian Nuclear Issue 
Iran started their civilian nuclear programme in the 1950s, in agreement with the US. In 1968 
Iran signed a non-proliferation treaty, agreeing that they would never develop nuclear weapons. 
In spite of this, the US suspected that Iran was planning the development of nuclear weapons. 
During the Islamic Revolution in 1979, Iran stopped their nuclear programme entirely. In 1984 
Ayatollah Khomeini restarted the nuclear programme (Risen, 2012). In the 1990’s, Russia helped 
Iran build two nuclear reactors, while the Americans concern were growing, and they started 
sanctioning Iran on the basis of the nuclear programme. The UN were observing Iran’s nuclear 
programme, and in 2002 they obtained intelligence from an Iranian opposition group, that 
pointed towards a great lack of transparency (Meier, 2013:3). In August 2003, the EU-3 send a 
joint letter to Iran, offering to negotiate and help build a civilian nuclear programme, thereby 
involving themselves directly in the dispute between Iran and the International Atomic Energy 
Agency (IAEA) (Meier, 2013:4). From 2004, the EU’s HR, Javier Solana, officially joined the 
negotiations, hereby marking the formalization of the EU-3/EU cooperation. The negotiations 
between EU-3/EU and Iran did not produce a successful outcome, and when Ahmadinejad came 
to power in 2005, the negotiations came to a stalemate. Ahmadinejad provoked several of the EU 
member states, in particular Germany, when he stated that the Holocaust was just a myth, further 
complicating the situation. In the beginning of 2006, the EU-3/EU called upon the UN Security 
Council, in order to solve the nuclear issue. The UN gave Iran an ultimatum: either stop the 
uranium enrichment or face sanctions (Meier, 2013:3-4). 
The UN imposed sanction on Iran in December 2006, with the EU following suit, imposing the 
same sanctions. These sanctions were targeted specifically on the development of a nuclear 
programme, and included bans on related technology and resources (EEAS, 2014B). Since Iran 
kept their nuclear programme going, the UN imposed a second round of sanctions in 2010. This 
time it entailed a ban on any military purchase, trade and financial transactions carried out by the 
Islamic Revolutionary Guards Corps, which is the institution in control of the nuclear 
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programme. The EU once again followed suit, imposing the same sanctions (EEAS, 2014B). In 
2011, the EU along with the US imposed another round of sanctions on Iran, cutting them off 
from the international banking system. The following year, the EU joined the US in imposing an 
oil embargo that paralyzed the Iranian economy (Christy & Zarate, 2014). 
In June 2013, Iran elected Hassan Rouhani as the new president. Rouhani indicated, in contrast 
to Ahmadinejad, that Iran was intent on cooperating with the sanctioning parties. For instance, he 
appointed Mohammad Javad Zarif, an American educated diplomat, as foreign minister and 
subsequently chief negotiator, in order to positively affect the negotiations (Maloney, 2013). 
As a result of the 2013 Joint Plan of Action between the EU/EU-3+3 and Iran, much of Tehran’s 
nuclear programme was altered, in exchange for relief from western sanctions. By January 2014, 
in order to fulfil the conditionalities of this interim deal, Iran showed a vital sign of good faith by 
limiting the production of plutonium at the Arak reactor (Christy & Zarate, 2014). 
In April 2015, the EU/EU-3+3 and Iran reached a temporary agreement. This agreement is, 
however, not a comprehensive deal that covers all the issues at hand, but instead a preliminary 
framework. The understanding between the negotiating parts include that Iran’s uranium 
enrichment infrastructure will be reduced by almost two thirds, for a period of 10 years. In 
addition to this, the Iranian plutonium production is also greatly reduced. Furthermore, there will 
be enhanced inspections by the IAEA for the next 20 years. In return, the bulk of the current 
international sanctions will be lifted. So far, the negotiators have set a deadline for the 30th June 
2015, in order to reach a comprehensive agreement (Embassy of the United States - London, 
2014). 
Summing up, the Iranian nuclear issue is centred on doubts about the nature of Iran’s nuclear 
programme, especially in relation to their plutonium and enriched uranium production 
capabilities. The EU/EU-3+3 has sought to deal with this through various rounds of sanctions 
and negotiations. 
 
4.2. Iran as a Regional Actor 
In terms of their relatively large population, economy, energy resources, military, history, culture 
and religion, Iran may arguably be characterized as one of the most influential actors in the 
Middle East (Larrabee & Nader, 2013:iii). Iran has, however, a relatively conflictual relationship 
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with most of the major actors in the Middle East, and their attempts to gain influence in the 
region concerns many global actors, including the EU/EU-3+3 (Larrabee & Nader, 2013:1-3). 
Disputes with Israel due to their close relationship to Hamas and Hezbollah, have caused 
tensions between the EU and the Iranian, causing fear of an Israeli-Iranian war in the region 
(Fulton & Farrar-Wellman, 2011). Likewise, Iran is seen as a regional rival to Saudi-Arabia, 
which can be perceived as a fight between Sunni and Shia dominance in the region, and this is 
arguably the reason why Saudi-Arabia wants to develop nuclear weapons (Fulton, Farrar-
Wellman & Frasco, 2011). Iran is a key player in the Middle East, having influence in both Iraq, 
Syria, Lebanon and Yemen, because as it is the greatest Shia power in the region (Adebahr, Otte 
& Tocci, 2014). These factors need to be included when analysing the EU-3 and the EU’s role 
and motives for engagement in the negotiations. Iran is a potentially important regional partner 
for the EU, in terms of trade, energy resources, security and stability (Appendix 4:6). 
The EU is, however, criticized for not having a long-term strategic plan in relation to Iran. The 
lack of an official EU representation in Iran, entrust the member states to be the only actors when 
it comes to protecting European interests in the area (Adebahr, Otte & Tocci, 2014). The regional 
context, in which the nuclear negotiations are conducted in, creates a strong incentive for both 
the EU member states to project its national interests to the EU level, and for the EU as a global 
actor to play an important role. 
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5. The EU-3’s Impact on the Role of the EU in the Negotiations 
This section presents the different interests of the EU-3 in Iran and how they have affected the 
EU’s actions in the negotiations on Iran’s nuclear programme. First, the different interests are 
explained. Secondly, it is established why it is attractive for a member state to upload its 
interests. This is followed by a specific analysis of how the interests of the EU have affected the 
actions of the EU. 
 
5.1 The interests of the EU-3 in Iran 
5.1.1. Germany 
Germany differs from the other actors in the nuclear negotiations, in a number of ways. First of 
all, they are the only actor in the negotiations, apart from Iran, who do not possess nuclear 
weapons, even though they have a civilian nuclear programme. Secondly, they are included in 
the negotiations as the only non-permanent member of the UN Security Council. 
 
The Iranian scholar Davood Kiani (2012) argues for the existence of a special and strong 
historical relationship between Germany and Iran. This dates back to the beginning of the 20th 
century, when Germany helped Iran with industrialisation, as well as building its infrastructure 
and economy (Kiani, 2012:129). While the UK and France had colonies in the Middle East and 
Russia in Central Asia, Germany found an influential and geo-strategic partner in Iran. 
According to Kiani, Iran does not perceived Germany as an imperial power wanting to exploit 
Iran and violate its territorial integrity, but instead as a partner (Kiani, 2012:29). During the 1979 
Islamic revolution in Iran, Germany kept its ambassador in Teheran, and continued its friendly 
relations with the country. Unlike other western powers, Germany refused to support Saddam 
Hussein during the Iran-Iraq War between 1980-1988, which helped Germany maintain its 
legitimacy and influence in Iran, even after the revolution (Kiani, 2012:135-136). The German 
scholar Volker Perthes (2005) agrees with Kiani, stating that Germany has kept its influence in 
Iran despite national, regional and global changes for both actors. Perthes argues that through the 
1990’s, Germany rejected the American, Israeli and Saudi-Arabian attempts to politically and 
economically isolates Iran, and as an example of this they supported Iranian membership of 
WTO (Perthes, 2005:3). Germany’s approach to Iran was labelled constructive dialogue in order 
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to send a clear message of engagement rather than isolation, this is still the present strategy of 
Germany (Perthes, 2005:3). Scholar Matthias Küntzel (2014) also acknowledges the existence of 
a strong German-Iranian relationship. The relationship is based on their large amount of 
technology trade between the two countries, and on Germany being the strongest opponent in 
Europe of a military strike against the nuclear facilities. He further argues that Germany has been 
Iran’s source of influence in the EU and that they have helped the government gain international 
legitimacy (Küntzel, 2014:230). Despite this, Küntzel remains critical towards Germany’s policy 
on Iran, and implies that they are two faced, by officially supporting Israel in the region, while at 
the same time maintaining good relations with the government in Iran (Küntzel, 2014:231).  
The German scholar Oliver Meier (2014) agrees with Küntzel’s perception of Germany as a 
mediator between Iran and Europe, but contrary to Küntzel, he perceives this as a great 
advantage. He argues, that Germany can have a positive influence on the region, as a great power 
with a civilian nuclear programme, through its nuclear disarmament policy, and because they 
advocate a multilateral engagement when solving the Iranian nuclear issue (Meier, 2014:6). 
Germany has thereby gained legitimacy with the Iranian government, as an actor determined to 
strengthen the non-proliferation norm, in conformity with international law (Meier, 2014:6-8). 
Scholar Emmanuel Blanc (2012) share the assumption that Germany has been the biggest 
opponent of a military strike among EU-states, and that Merkel even personally called Benjamin 
Netanyahu in order to prevent Israel from attacking Iran’s nuclear facilities (Blanc, 2012:6). 
 
Germany is the EU-3 country with the closest economic and commercial ties to Iran (Appendix 
4:2). Germany imported products from Iran for a value of 304 million euros in 2002. This 
reached 716 millions in 2011, before the economic and financial sanctions were imposed, and 
then dropped to 280 millions in 2014 (Appendix 2). Even though there was a 436 million drop in 
the import, over a course of 3 years, Germany’s import from Iran is still nine times the size of 
France’s, and seven times the size of the UK’s. Even more remarkable is Germany’s export to 
Iran. In 2002 the export was 2,236 million euros. This increased to 3,082 millions in 2011, and 
then dropped to 2,390 millions with a loss of 692 million euros in 3 years. Germany’s export to 
Iran is, however, still five times the size of France’s and 21 times the size of the UK’s (Appendix 
2). 
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Despite the fact that Germany, as a consequence of the sanctions, has lost millions of euros in 
trade with Iran, it is by far Iran’s largest economic partner in Europe (Appendix 2). Furthermore, 
German energy companies have been involved in a proposal to build a gas pipeline from Iran to 
Europe, that would gain Germany access to the second largest natural gas reserve in the world 
(Weinthal, 2012). 
 
Germany’s interests and relationship with Iran has been challenged since the nuclear negotiations 
started in 2003. Germany is still a strong supporter of Israel’s right to exist, and when the former 
Iranian president Ahmadinejad stated that the Holocaust was a myth, and that Israel should be 
wiped of the map, it caused outrage in Germany, which complicated the relationship between 
Iran and Germany (Appendix 1:4). Even though Germany rejects the use of military force, they 
have continuously imposed harsh economic sanctions through the EU. It can be argued, that 
Germany has had difficulties in balancing national interests, with the common interests of the 
EU, and the relationship to the UK, France and the US during the negotiations. This division 
between the EU-3 became apparent in September 2007 when Germany rejected an American, 
British and French proposal of a third sanction resolution on Iran (Cooper, 2009). Tensions 
further increased, when Germany remained critical of imposing sanctions outside the UN 
framework, and blamed the US and France for being hypocrites, as they demanded tougher 
sanctions while having companies engaged in Iran (Meier, 2013:9). Moreover, Germany opposed 
a common withdrawal of EU diplomatic staff in Iran, something that the UK had urged for in the 
wake of the political crisis with Iran, following the detention of British embassy staff (Meier, 
2013:15). German cautiousness of imposing tougher economic sanctions against Iran, outside the 
UN framework, crumbled when both France and the UK pressed for independent EU sanctions. 
The imposition of sanctions created disputes, and the US criticized Germany for being reluctant 
to prevent its banks from doing business with Iranian banks, for example in relation to closing 
the Iranian owned bank Europäisch-Iranische Handelsbank (Weinthal, 2010). 
 
Due to Germany’s economic, political and historical relations with Iran, their diplomatic strategy 
has been challenged by both pursuing the common EU interests, and national interests. 
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Germany may be perceived as an actor that plays a bridging role between the US, France and the 
UK on one side and China, Russia and Iran on the other side in the negotiations, and thereby they 
are a very important actor. This assumption is challenged by a more sceptical view of Germany, 
as an economic actor, that gambles with its strategic partnerships with the US, the UK, France 
and Israel on behalf of its economic interests and political influence in Iran. 
 
5.1.2. France 
The non-proliferation of nuclear weapons is of great importance to France, as it is one of the core 
pillars of their foreign policy (French Ministry of Foreign Affairs and International 
Development, 2015A)(Bahout & Haddad, 2015). Meanwhile, France has its own nuclear 
weapons, which gives them a comparative advantages in international affairs, and this is an 
advantage that they do not wish Iran obtain (Appendix 4:1). France officially supports the 
diplomatic negotiations, as they aim for an agreement that ensures that Iran can maintain a 
civilian nuclear programme, without the possibility of obtaining nuclear weapons (French 
Ministry of Foreign Affairs and International Development, 2015B). In 2007 the French foreign 
minister at the time, Bernard Kouchner, said in relation to Iran’s nuclear programme, “We have 
to prepare for the worst, and the worst is war.” (Meier, 2013:9), which completely opposes the 
EU’s stance on a non-military solution (Adebahr, 2014). This indicates, that France is willing to 
go further than the EU, in the pursuit of an agreement. 
Before the interim deal of 2015 was made, France were the sole opponent of an US lead proposal 
that would lift some of the UN sanctions, if Iran in turn agreed to some of the terms set by the 
EU/EU-3+3 (Borger & Roberts, 2015). Unless Iran could provide verifiable evidence that they 
were in compliance with said terms, France would not agree to lift any sanctions (French 
Ministry of Foreign Affairs and International Development, 2015B). The diplomatic framework 
for the negotiations has taken more than a decade to establish, and thus France are not willing to 
slack on the demands, thereby wasting all the hard diplomatic work (Borger & Roberts, 2015). 
On previous occasions, the French have stated that they were willing to use stricter sanctions if 
necessary, which conflicts with the position of some of the other EU-3 countries (Reynolds, 
2012). 
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In order to understand why France differs from the other actors in the negotiations, it is 
necessary to analyse their relations in the Middle East, as their interests are diverse in the region. 
The economic crisis has greatly impacted France, and they have been struggling to recover from 
the recession. At that time, France was offered to supply Saudi-Arabia with weapons and 
military equipment in a 1.5 billion dollar deal, which was hard for the French to refuse (Parry, 
2014). This did, however, leave France in a dilemma as they now had a huge economic incentive 
to follow some of the Saudi-Arabian interests in relation to the Iranian negotiations (Parry, 
2014). An agreement with Iran would contribute not only to a non-proliferation of nuclear 
weapons, but also to the stability of the region (Bahout & Haddad, 2015). As France has found a 
new and important trading partner in Saudi-Arabia, they wish to establish stability and security 
in the region, so that their relationship can stay intact. Furthermore, if Saudi-Arabia could be 
established as the region's most prominent actor, France would benefit even more (Parry, 2014). 
The importance of the economic relationship between France and the Gulf States becomes even 
clearer when Hollande signed a new 7 billion dollar deal in Qatar, on several fighting jets (Irish, 
2015). Saudi-Arabia does not want Iran to obtain nuclear weapons, and they fear Iran would be 
able to finance their proxies, and thus destabilise the region, if the sanctions are lifted (Irish, 
2015). Furthermore both Saudi-Arabia and France fear that Iran could become a regional 
hegemon once the sanctions were lifted (Appendix 4:1). In order to reach an agreement and at 
the same time take Saudi-Arabia concerns into account, France wants to reach a verifiable and 
binding agreement with Iran (Irish, 2015). In contrast to the US, France tend to take their 
relationship with the Gulf States more into account in the negotiations, and Joseph Bahout 
(2015) even argues that Israel perceives France as the spokesman for the Gulf States, in the 
negotiations (Appendix 4:5). The relationship between Saudi-Arabia and France is further 
showed in 2015, when the interim deal was about to come into place. The French negotiators met 
up with their Saudi counterparts, before the negotiations on the nuclear programme started, and 
discussed how France should approach the negotiations. They agreed that it was essential to keep 
the stability and security in the region, also after a potential deal on the nuclear programme with 
the Iranians was in place (Irish, 2015). 
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France is a former colonial power, and that legacy still follows them in international affairs. 
(Appendix 4:1-2). This is evident when looking at France’s relationship to Syria, which is an old 
French colony (Parry, 2014). Due to their historical ties, France is inflicted by Syria’s problems, 
and for that reason, the French support the rebellions efforts to overthrow president Assad (Parry, 
2014). The French are concerned that Iran might increase its support to the regime in Syria, if the 
sanctions on Iran are lifted (Appendix 4:1-2). As Saudi-Arabia is also trying to overthrow Assad, 
another alliance is formed, and as the Syrians are old allies with Iran, this naturally troubles the 
negotiations even further. This enforces the relationship with the Saudi-Arabians, and in that 
respect brings the French further away from Iran (Parry, 2014). An old imperial legacy, thus 
affects the current negotiations of the nuclear programme, since France are working together 
with the old enemies of Iran. 
France is arguably the toughest actor in the negotiations on Iran’s nuclear programme, albeit they 
still want an agreement, they are very reluctant to alleviate on their demands on Iran. We 
expostulate that France has different interests in the negotiations on Iran’s nuclear programme. 
First, there is the economic aspect, where the trade agreements with the Gulf states, in particular 
Saudi-Arabia, gives France an economic incentive to change their approach to the negotiations. 
Secondly we see that their common opponent, Assad, enforces the relationship between Saudi-
Arabia and France. At the same time, there is a normative aspect for the French involvement in 
negotiations, as they have historically been working to ensure the non-proliferation of nuclear 
weapons. 
 
5.1.3. The United Kingdom 
The UK is to a large extent on pair with the French approach to the negotiations, especially since 
they both possess nuclear weapons, which gives them an advantage in international affairs, that 
they do not want Iran to have (Appendix 4:5). But the UK has its history and interests in Iran. 
Their relationship with Iran has been very unstable throughout most of the history. In the 19th 
century the UK was very active in the area, which led to a series of wars and a large amount of 
trade between the two countries (Pedram, 2011). The Middle East analyst Ali M. Pedram (2011) 
argues that British interactions in the region have created close relations with some of the 
counterparts to Iran, and the Brits have therefore historically been in opposition to Iran (Pedram, 
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2011). In more recent history, the relationship has been affected by attacks on both the Iranian 
embassy in London in 1980 (Davison, 2011) and on the British embassy in Tehran in 2011 
(McElroy, 2011), twice straining the diplomatic ties between the two countries. 
Reynolds (2012) argues that the Iranians believe that the UK, and especially the British 
television channel, BBC Persia, is involved in most of the rebellions against the Iranian 
government. This leaves the Iranian leaders and a large amount of the population very sceptical 
towards the UK. The critical discussions on BBC Persia about the legality of Ahmadinejad’s 
second election, caused outrage from the Iranian government, and parts of the population, 
towards the UK (Reynolds, 2012). 
A report from the House of Common Foreign Affairs Committee from 2014 states that the UK 
perceives Iran as a key player in establishing security in the Middle East. A key argument is that 
Iran has threatened to close the Strait of Hormuz, where 17 % of the world’s oil production 
passes through, and that they have a close relationship to organisations such as Hamas and 
Hezbollah. It is therefore crucial for the UK to solve the nuclear issues with Iran, in a way that 
helps establish more stability in the region (House of Common Foreign Affairs Committee, 
2014). As a result of the UK’s focus on establishing stability in the region, former foreign 
secretary William Hague, announced in June 2014 that the UK and Iran are re-establishing their 
diplomatic relations with the common goal of reopening the embassies (Blair, 2014). A primary 
reason that the UK is a part of the negotiations is that they deem it necessary, in order to 
establish peace in the region. One of the UK’s main interests is, however, to re-establish bilateral 
diplomatic relations with Iran, which affects how strict an approach they may have towards the 
Iranians (Pedram, 2011). 
The House of Common Foreign Affairs Committee argues that the UK has tied its interactions in 
the nuclear negotiations to be following the US’s. In 2011, the UK confirmed that it had 
increased its planning of the possible use of force against Iran, together with the US (Hopkins, 
2011). Bahout (2015) goes as far as stating that the UK colludes with the US, in terms of their 
diplomatic approach, which highly affects their foreign policy (Appendix 4:5). In 2003 at the 
initial phase of the nuclear negotiations, the UK tried to get the US to join the process of the EU-
3 towards a diplomatic solution. The attempts of the UK to get the US to acknowledge the 
proposal of the EU-3 were rejected by the Bush administration (Meier, 2013:5). Meier (2013) 
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argues that this indicates how important it is for the UK to cooperate with the US. The EU-3 did 
nevertheless travel to Iran to negotiate, which the US regarded as a setback in the multilateral 
approach, delaying the UN resolutions (Meier, 2013:5). The UK has, despite a great history of 
trade with Iran, a relatively low economic relation with Iran. The trade between the UK and Iran 
are lower than the other European actors in the negotiations (Appendix 2). Before the economic 
sanctions were imposed in 2012, the UK’s import was half the size of Germany’s, and four times 
lower than France’s. Similar the UK’s export to Iran was eight times lower than France’s, and 15 
times lower than Germany’s (Appendix 2). This indicates that the UK does not have the same 
economic interests in Iran as the other actors, which also makes the impact from the sanctions 
affordable. Following this, the UK’s freeze of all bank relations with Iran, in 2011, did in fact not 
change much because of the very low amount of interactions in the previous years (Pedram, 
2011). 
The UK’s bad reputation in Iran, their close relationship with the US and their relatively low 
economic interdependence with Iran, are some of the interest that affects the UK, in the 
negotiations. 
Throughout most of the negotiations, the HR Catherine Ashton, who is British, has represented 
the EU. This could possibly have an effect on the actions of the UK in the negotiations, because 
she could work on the main goal for the country, without the British government being directly 
involved. When Catherine Ashton was taking the lead in the negotiations it provided the UK 
with more influence than if it was another actor taking the lead (Korteweg, 2013). 
 
5.2. Europeanization Analysis of the EU-3’s Interests 
This section analyses on the different interests of the EU-3. First we establish why it makes sense 
for the EU-3 to upload their preferences to the EU level and then, through the use of 
Europeanization, we analyse which interests have affected the role of the EU. 
 
As mentioned, Flers and Müller (2010) argue, that by taking a multilateral approach, the 
negotiating actors stand to gain more efficiency. Referring to the concept of politics of scale, the 
EU-3 gain more power that enables them to achieve their goals. This supports the arguments set 
forth by Adebahr (2014) and Kienzle (2013), underlining that it was when the EU introduced the 
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multilateral approach to the negotiations, that there was a substantial breakthrough (Adebahr 
2014) (Kienzle 2013:45). Based on this argument, it would seem attractive for the EU-3 to 
upload their preferences to the EU, while taking collective action. 
 
The interests and relations between the different EU-3 countries and Iran affect their individual 
approaches to the sanctions policies. As Borzel and Panke (2009) argue, uploading of 
preferences from the national to the EU level is determined by the actor’s capabilities and power 
to change and shape the EU’s policies (Borzel & Panke, 2009:406-407). Overall, France, 
Germany and the UK have the same goal in the negotiations. They all want Iran to be able to 
have a civilian purpose nuclear programme, without the possibility of developing nuclear 
weapons (Christy & Zarate, 2013). Despite this, the EU-3 countries have different strategies in 
order to reach this goal, and these strategies are highly affected by the countries own norms and 
interests. 
Neither France nor the UK will deny military force as an option, because they have an interest in 
keeping the US as a close ally, and as a result, they have primarily followed an American lead 
(Hopkins, 2011) (Appendix 4:5). Germany has based, on their history, developed a negative 
stance towards the use of force (Appendix 4:2). In the case of Iran, Germany has a strong interest 
in shaping and strengthening a common norm at the EU level, that rejects the use of force as a 
conflict management tool (Meier, 2014:6-8). The EU has not used the threat of military force in 
relation to the negotiations so far, and as the EU is advocating for a diplomatic solution, the use 
of force does not seem to be a viable option at all (Adebahr, 2014). Germany had incentive to 
change other member states, most notably France and the UK’s, ideas and interests through a 
normative suasion. By uploading their norms to the EU, they have contributed to shaping a 
common norm of diplomacy and restraint in terms of the use of force, in the attempt to prevent 
Iran from obtaining nuclear weapons (Meier, 2014:6-8). While France and the UK have common 
interests in strengthening these norms, Germany had larger economic interests and closer 
political ties at stake. 
 
In 2007, France and the UK attempted to make the sanctions stricter (Cooper, 2009). France was 
willing to impose stricter sanctions, through the EU, in order to increase the pressure on Iran 
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(Reynolds, 2012), as was the UK, because it would be in line with the tougher approach of the 
US towards Iran (Appendix 4:5). Germany was, however, at that time reluctant to support the EU 
sanctions, outside the UN framework, as they wanted to deal with the problem in a multilateral 
framework (Cooper, 2009). As we saw later on, the EU extended its sanctions independently of 
the UN (Christy & Zarate, 2013), and thus, the UK and France uploaded their interests, 
influencing a common interest expressed in the Strategy Against Proliferation of Weapons of 
Mass Destruction (WMD) (2003). The EU did, however, opt for dealing with the negotiations in 
a multilateral framework, facilitating the negotiations between the EU, France, Germany, the 
UK, the US, China, Russia and Iran (Christy & Zarate, 2013). The interest of Germany, 
regarding the framework for dealing with the issue, was hereby also successfully uploaded. 
During the political crisis between the UK and Iran in 2009, the UK urged all the EU countries to 
withdraw all diplomatic personnel from Iran. As mentioned, Germany is opposed to isolating 
Iran from the international system, and in this case they managed to upload this interest to the 
rest of the EU, preventing the EU member states from cutting their diplomatic ties to Iran (Meier, 
2013:15). 
 
As the non-proliferation norm has always been an important part of French foreign policy, they 
have been highly involved in the negotiations. The interests of France in the negotiations are 
further determined by its economic and military ties to Saudi-Arabia (Perry, 2014). This entails 
that France wants stronger conditions and terms in the agreement, than the UK or Germany 
might suggest (French Ministry of Foreign Affairs and International Development, 2015B). 
France has also been eager to strengthen the sanctions on Iran, in order to increase the pressure 
(Reynolds, 2012). Germany was greatly opposed to this proposition, due to their extensive trade 
relations with Iran. Since Germany is much more economically interdependent with Iran than 
France and the UK, stricter sanctions would be a greater loss for the Germans, than the other EU-
3 countries (Appendix 2). Despite of Germany’s economic interests, the EU has, on several 
occasions, agreed to impose economic and financial sanctions on Iran (Christy & Zarate, 2013). 
France has been able to upload their norm in relation to the non-proliferation of nuclear weapons 
to the EU, which has resulted in putting even greater pressure on Iran. Even though the Germans 
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were against these economic sanctions to begin with, they seem to have accepted them, and to 
some degree downloaded this norm. 
 
5.3. Sum-up 
Based on the analysis above, the importance of the EU-3, in matters of how the EU conducts its 
policies in relation to Iran’s nuclear programme, seems quite substantial. By providing an 
understanding of the interests of the EU-3, we hereby provide a snapshot of what part these 
interests play, in the making of the EU’s role in the negotiations on Iran’s nuclear programme. 
The interests of Germany are mainly shaped by its close historical, political and economic ties to 
Iran, while interests of France are mainly centred on improving economic and military ties to the 
rivals of Iran in the region. Meanwhile, the interests of the UK in Iran are shaped by its 
conflictual history, close US relationship and relatively small economic interdependence. 
Germany has mainly uploaded their preferences, to the EU level, by shaping and strengthening a 
non-military approach towards Iran, and by maintaining a norm of political dialogue through a 
multilateral approach. France and the UK have both advocated for further economic sanctions, in 
order to reach an agreement, which is something they have been able to upload. Furthermore, 
uploads from France and the UK have resulted in the EU acting independently from the UN, in 
their sanctioning policy. 
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6. The Role of the EU in the Nuclear Negotiations 
This section first presents the nature of the EU as a foreign policy actor, which provides a 
perspective on what causes the EU to take action in foreign affairs. In order to determine the role 
of the EU, we examine their actions specifically in relation to Iran. In capturing the actions of the 
EU, we identify the use of sanctions and diplomacy as the two key elements in the EU’s 
management of Iran’s nuclear programme. Furthermore, we analyse to what extent the behaviour 
of the US, Russia and China in the negotiations affects the role of the EU. Lastly, we combine 
our findings from the analysis of the EU’s sanctions, diplomatic approach and relations to other 
actors, in order to understand the EU as a foreign policy actor. 
 
6.1. The Nature of the EU in Foreign Affairs 
This section outlines the foundation upon which the EU build their foreign policy, in order to 
better understand what kind of actor the EU strives to be and why they would want to engage 
themselves in the Iranian nuclear issue. 
 
Expert on European politics Anna Michalski (2005) presents the argument that the EU as a 
political regime is based on a “strong normative component”. This means that the EU’s foreign 
policy doctrine is centred on the inherent values, norms and principles of the EU, such as human 
rights, the rule of law, democracy and peace (Michalski, 2005:126). The position of Ian Manners 
(2002) is in line with Michaelski’ (2005) assumption that the EU, in general, relies on a 
normative basis, when it comes to foreign affairs. He argues that through pooling of sovereignty, 
democratic conditionalities and the pursue of human rights, the EU is a unique character, 
changing what is normal in international affairs (Manners, 2002:253). 
In contrast Hedley Bull (1982) argues that normative power is not a power on its own, because it 
is conditional upon military power (Bull, 1982:151). This argument contests the tenability of 
Michalski’s assumption, by arguing that the power of the EU in foreign affairs is not feasible on 
its own, meaning that the EU cannot be a completely autonomous actor (Bull, 1982:151). 
Manners (2002) disagrees with Bull’s assumption, and states that normative power can indeed be 
a power on its own, and that this could actually be the greatest power of all (Manners, 2002:253). 
The fact that the foreign policy of the EU has a normative basis does, however, not mean that it 
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relies unconditionally on normative power. According to Manners, there is a clear distinction 
between the two. He argues, that hard power tools, such as economic sanctions, may contribute 
to forwarding norms. In doing so it cannot be said, however, that the EU has changed the 
perception of its target, to be in line with the norms of the EU, through normative power alone 
(Manners, 2002:32). Furthermore, Michalski argues that the biggest challenge the EU is facing, 
by relying on a normative basis, is conveying the strengths of it to all those whom they interact 
with, as this is decisive in terms of how much impact the EU can have on others. Effectively 
diffusing the norms, values and principles of the EU, in order to persuade other actors that these 
norms constitute what is appropriate in international politics, thereby becomes the key in 
legitimizing the power and political doctrine of the EU (Michalski, 2005:127). Due to this 
imperative, in relation to shaping the perception of other actors, the strategy applied by the EU is 
centred on forwarding the norms, values and principles vital to their policy regime (Michalski, 
2005:126). This is reflected in the Common Foreign and Security Policy (CFSP) of the EU, 
which includes dealing with violations of human rights, democratic principles and the rule of law 
as its objectives (EEAS, 2015B). The lack of ability to convey the norms, values and principles 
of the EU, projecting their vision of a political world order onto others, is the reason why the EU 
sometimes is perceived as a weak actor in international politics, in spite of the political 
capabilities they possess. This makes the EU an easy target for both external pressure and 
internal influence, in the form of member states projecting their own national interests onto the 
foreign policy agenda of the EU (Michalski, 2005:125). 
Bretherton and Vogler describe three protector roles that the EU may assume, in relation to 
external challenges, one of these roles being protection from threats to stability and security. For 
the EU to validly assume this protector role, three particular perceptions must be embedded 
within the EU, as described by Ben Rosamond (2001) (Bretherton & Vogler, 2006:55). First of 
all, there must be a recognition of a particular challenge. Secondly, there must be a perception of 
the need for a solution at the EU level, rather than the individual member states dealing with it, 
on account of their own strategies. Lastly, there must be a consensus among the member states 
and external key actors, constructing the EU as a valid, regional space in which to deal with the 
challenge (Rosamond, 2001:168). 
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Michalski (2005) claims that the EU has problems with conveying their norms, values and 
principles in foreign affairs to other actors. In the case of Iran, it can be argued that the EU’s 
attempt to diffuse its values did not prevent Iran from continuing the nuclear programme, or the 
use of economic sanctions. The EU did, on basis of its own norm, convince the EU/EU-3+3 that 
military force was not the solution and that multilateralism and direct diplomacy is desirable. 
The normative basis for the EU’s foreign policy, however, had some limitations, in terms of 
spreading the inherent normative values against WMD, through the use of economic sanctions. 
According to Ian Manners (2002), hard power capabilities might improve the spread of 
normative values, but it is not a case of normative power if it is not diffused from the norm itself. 
This creates a complexity for the EU in the case of Iran, where it can be hard to distinguish 
between the roles of the EU as a normative values based power, or its role as security or 
economic power. 
In light of arguments put forth by Michalski (2005), it makes sense for the EU to engage 
themselves in the Iranian nuclear negotiations, due to the fact that the issue deals with the EU’s 
norms, values and principles on the non-proliferation of weapons of mass destruction. The EU’s 
legitimacy and impact in foreign affairs depends on their success in forwarding this norm to 
other actors in the international society. 
 
6.2. The Rationale of the EU’s Sanction Policy 
This part of the analysis is to further examine the role of the EU in the nuclear negotiations 
through their use of sanctions. We first describe the EU’s official policy on sanctions, and the 
actual sanctions imposed on Iran. Subsequently, theoretical framework of Crawford and Klotz is 
used to analyse what the rational basis of the EU’s use of sanctions has been in the case of Iran’s 
nuclear programme. 
 
6.2.1. The EU’s Sanction Policy 
The EU as a global actor possesses a range of conflict management tools. Bretherton and Vogler 
argue that sanctions are the most common and relevant tool in the EU’s conflict management 
strategy, due to the Unions large economic capabilities (Bretherton & Vogler, 2006:87). This 
enables the EU to coerce third countries by indirectly excluding them from the internal market of 
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the EU, and directly by imposing targeted sanctions against a country's economic, financial, 
military or industrial sector (Bretherton & Vogler, 2006:87-88). In the case of Iran’s nuclear 
programme, sanctions, combined with diplomacy, have been the most commonly used tools of 
the EU, in order to prevent Iran from obtaining nuclear weapons. 
 
In order to analyse the EU’s sanction policy on Iran, it is necessary to examine the official 
strategies of the EU such as the Security Strategy (2003), the Strategy Against Proliferation of 
Weapons of Mass Destruction (WMD) (2003) and the Basic Principles on the Use of Restrictive 
Measures (Sanctions) (2004). 
The Security Strategy highlights the proliferation of WMD as one of the key global threats today, 
which cannot be ignored by the EU. In the Security Strategy, the EU states that: “(…) none of the 
new threats is purely military; nor can any be tackled by purely military means. Each requires a 
mixture of instruments.” (Council, 2003A:7). The instruments referred to are trade restrictions 
and export control, political and diplomatic pressure, economic sanctions and military assets 
(Council, 2003A:7). The Strategy Against WMD allows the EU, through the UN Charter VII, to 
use sanctions, diplomatic pressure and an adequate use of military force (Council, 2003B:5). 
Following this, the EU’s sanction strategy affirms that the EU should strive to implement 
sanctions through a UN-framework, with the UN as the leading actor. It is, nonetheless, still 
possible for the EU to impose sanctions independent of the UN. Moreover, the sanctions should 
be context based and part of a comprehensive strategy, which includes diplomatic negotiations 
and conditionalities (Council, 2004:1-3). 
 
Italian scholar Francesco Giumelli (2013) argues that the EU’s sanction policy can be divided 
into four sub-policies: Arms embargoes, travel bans, economic measures and financial measures 
(Giumelli, 2013:22). The most common sanction is the use of travel bans that target individuals 
and groups from travelling to the EU. The second most used sanction is the arms embargo, which 
includes bans on weapons or technology related to the service (Giumelli, 2013:22-23). The third 
most frequent policy is a financial sanction that includes restrictions on financial transactions, 
loans, and freezing of assets. The fourth and least common policy is economic sanctions, which 
implies bans on the trade of goods, energy resources and general supplies (Giumelli, 2013:23-
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24). Economic and financial sanctions are, according to Giumelli, the most effective and 
comprehensive sanctions, but also more controversial for the EU to use, as they require both 
internal coherence and a threat which must be dealt with at the EU level (Giumelli, 2013:23-24). 
 
The security strategy, the WMD strategy and the sanction strategy aim to create a more internal 
coherent foreign and security policy in the EU that can deal with potential threats, and prevent a 
new division among the member states in a high-level security case (Kienzle, 2013:44). The 
strategies were, immediately tested and put into action when the negotiations with Iran began in 
2003, and the impact of these strategies can help us gain knowledge of how the actions of the 
EU, affects its role in the negotiations. 
 
6.2.2. The Effects of the Sanctions Against Iran 
The EU imposed the first sanctions against Iran in 2006 in accordance to the UN resolution. The 
sanctions can be characterized as an arms embargo since they were related to weapon 
technologies, missile systems and nuclear resources that could enable Iran building a bomb 
(EEAS, 2014B). In 2010, the UN sanctions were expanded to include ban on military assets and 
targeted more specifically trade and business conducted by the Islamic Revolutionary Guard and 
other institutions or groups that were involved in the nuclear programme (EEAS, 2014B). The 
EU’s sanction strategy towards Iran changed in 2011, when they imposed new sanctions together 
with the US, outside of the UN framework. This enabled the EU to impose much tougher 
financial sanctions on Iran’s banking system. The EU expanded its financial sanctions to include 
an oil embargo in order to get Iran to comply with the EU’s terms (EEAS, 2012A). The 
framework, strength of the sanctions. The EU’s sanction strategy on Iran can therefore be 
characterized as a changeable process in relation to 
 
The sanctions have had a huge impact on both Iran and the EU. From 2002-2011, before the 
economic and financial sanctions were imposed, the EU increased its trade import from Iran by 
5.6 billion euros in 2002, to 17.3 in 2011. This, however, dropped till 11.6 billion euros in 2014 
after further EU sanctions were imposed in 2012 (Appendix 3). Similar effects can be seen in the 
EU’s trade export to Iran. From 2002 till 2011 the export increased from 83.1 to 104.9 billion 
 40	  
euros. This, however, dropped till 64.1 billion euros in 2014, which is actually below the 2002 
export with Iran (Appendix 3). The consequences of the sanction thereby become evident when 
the EU’s import from Iran decreases with 33 % and the export by 39 % from 2012-2014 
(Appendix 3). 
 
Even though the sanctions were not intended to affect Iranian population, they have had 
humanitarian costs. As an example, during the earthquake in northern Iran in 2012, the 
humanitarian organisations had difficulties when financing their operations, due to the sanctions 
(Gordon, 2013). The sanctions on several important trade areas have affected several other 
sectors, because a lot of companies cannot find an affordable way of transporting their goods in 
and out of Iran nor can they find banks that want to cooperate with them (Gordon, 2013). Iran’s 
economic situation is indeed affected by the sanctions, which has caused the inflation rate to 
peak with 45,3 % in January 2013, and has caused a negative growth in GDP (Iles, 2014:8). The 
government have worked hard to prevent a possible breakdown in the economy which has 
lowered the inflation and caused a growth on 1,7 % in GDP in 2014 (Iles, 2014:9). The forecast 
for Iran’s economy is slightly positive, but it is clear that they cannot get a functioning market 
and stable economy as long as the sanctions are in place (Iles, 2014:8). 
 
6.2.3. Analysis of the Rationale 
In this section, the sanctions on Iran imposed by the EU will be analysed, in relation to the 
analytical framework of Crawford and Klotz. This allows us to understand the rational basis of 
the EU’s use of sanctions on Iran. 
 
The EU has imposed several sanctions specifically targeted on the Iranian nuclear sector. In 
2010, an embargo on goods and technology related to the development of a nuclear weapon 
system, particularly aimed at enrichment and heavy water processes, was put into effect 
(European Commission, 2014). With the targeted sanctions, the EU tried to deter Iran from 
developing nuclear weapons. This strategy initially points towards a resource denial based 
approach. There are, however, many additional sanctions imposed by the EU in relation to the 
nuclear negotiations that exceeds the field of nuclear power. Sanctions directly targeted at the 
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nuclear sector are only found in the first round of sanctions, and they were imposed alongside 
bans on the service, technology and production aspects of the oil and gas industry (European 
Commission, 2014). There were also sanctions on the financial sector, as financial aid to the 
Iranian government, and cooperation with Iranian banks were banned. In 2012, additional bans 
were made on the oil industry, as well as on gold and precious metals (European Commission, 
2014). This indicates a shift from a resource denial approach, towards an approach based on a 
compellence rationale. From 2006-2011 the resource denial sanction strategy did not improve the 
negotiation process between the EU and Iran, as the sanctions had no significant impact on Iran’s 
nuclear policy (Meier, 2013:3). The EU’s new rationale of imposing financial and economic 
sanctions on Iran was simply not possible through a UN-framework. Even though the UN 
sanctions from 2006-2011 were gradually tightened, the EU saw them as insufficient, since they 
were only limited to arms, missiles and nuclear technology, in order to prevent Iran from 
obtaining nuclear weapons (Blanc, 2014:19-20). Janne Bjerre Christensen (2015) supports this 
claim by arguing that the EU’s rationale behind changing the sanction strategy to compellence 
was to make the costs of pursuing the nuclear programme extremely high for Iran (Appendix 
1:9) and that a resource denial strategy did not prevent Iran from pushing forward with the 
nuclear programme (Appendix 1:3). After the financial and economic sanctions were imposed, 
the EEAS stated: “EU sanctions are designed to persuade Iran to comply with its international 
obligations and constrain its development of sensitive technologies in support of its nuclear and 
missile programmes.“ (EEAS, 2012A) they further argue that it is necessary to get Iran to the 
negotiation table through coercive measures (EEAS, 2012A). 
In terms of normative communication, the EU’s normative non-proliferation position is reflected 
in official documents, such as the Security Strategy (2003), the Strategy Against Proliferation of 
Weapons of Mass Destruction (WMD) (2003) and the Basic Principles on the Use of Restrictive 
Measures (Sanctions) (2004). In recognition of this being an internationally recognized norm, it 
entails that the EU sanctions are legitimized, due to Iran’s violation of said norm. Crawford and 
Klotz argue, that the effectiveness of the sanctions is strengthened if the coercer has serious costs 
when imposing them (Crawford & Klotz, 1999:28). As described earlier, the EU has suffered 
heavy economic losses, in imposing their sanctions, indicating that they are willing to accept the 
losses in order to enforce their norm (Appendix 3). Based on the analytical framework, we argue 
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that the EU has had a normative communicative rational basis, perceiving Iran as receptive to the 
normative arguments of non-proliferation of WMD. This argument is also supported by the fact 
that the UN also has sanctioned Iran in relation to their nuclear programme, isolating Iran as a 
pariah state, which indicates that the whole international system has developed a norm of non-
proliferation of WMD (Bajoria, 2011). Another indication of a shift in rationale is the 
contradictory perceptions inherent in the resource denial model, and the normative 
communication model. They are opposed in the sense that they rely on perceiving your target as 
either non-receptive or receptive, respectively, to normative incentives (Crawford & Klotz, 
1999:28). This means that the EU’s strategy in the negotiations has developed over time. The 
sanctions started as resource denial, which entails that Iran was, at first, not receptive to 
normative arguments. This, however, changed when Iran accepted the norm of non-proliferation 
of WMD, allowing a strategy of normative communication and compellence. 
The analytic framework of Crawford and Klotz also entails a fourth strategy of political fracture. 
The sanctions have affected the population and civil society in Iran, but whether this is a direct 
strategic goal from the EU, is very hard to determine. Based on our findings, we did not find any 
indications that the strategy of political fracture was present in the EU’s sanctions, at least not in 
their official strategy or in their use of sanctions. 
 
This analysis shows that there has been shift in the rational basis of the sanctions. Previously the 
EU sought to enforce their non-proliferation norm with resource denial sanctions. But as the 
WMD strategy of the EU indicates, it may become necessary to impose tough sanctions in order 
to coerce the target, which is exactly what the EU did, thus shifting towards a compellence 
strategy. This is better suited to the EU’s rationale about normative communication, implying 
that the EU perceives Iran as receptive to normative arguments. There would have been a clash 
between normative communication and resource denial, as the latter implies that your target is 
not receptive to normative arguments (Crawford & Klotz, 1999:28). The sanctions strategy of the 
EU therefore changed from a resource denial towards compellence strategy, while normative 
communication also became a rationale in the sanction strategy. 
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6.3. The US, Russia and China’s Impact on the Role of the EU in the 
Negotiations 
In order to fully comprehend the EU as a global actor, it is necessary to include dependent 
variables such as the context of the case, and key global players (Flers & Müller, 2010:5). 
Bretherton & Vogler argue, based on their analytical framework, that the role of the EU is highly 
determined by the external opportunities, which can influence the EU’s actions (Bretherton & 
Vogler, 2006:22-24). This section will therefore examine how the US, Russia and China 
influences the EU’s role in the negotiations with Iran. 
  
6.3.1. The United States 
The relationship between The US and the EU’s relationship in the negotiations have been 
characterized by cooperation and disagreements. During the Bush administration, the role of the 
EU in the negotiations was shaped in contrast to the American approach. From 2003-2006, the 
EU/EU3 managed to negotiate directly with the Iranian government on the nuclear issue, while 
the US pressured for a diplomatic and economic isolation of Iran (Alvaro & Tabrizi, 2014:15). 
As the Bush administration proclaimed Iran as part of the “axis of evil”, they blamed the EU for 
indirectly supporting the Iranian government. The EU thus tried to balance between maintaining 
the global alliance with the US, who threatened to overthrow the Iranian government, while 
keeping direct diplomatic talks with Iran (Alvaro & Tabrizi, 2014:16). The role of the EU in the 
negotiations was therefore mainly created, and strengthens, in contrast to the American strategy 
of isolation and intimidation (Meier, 2013:3-4). In 2006, the US pushed the EU for tougher 
sanctions, outside of the UN framework. This, however, failed because the EU rejected to 
impose economic or financial sanctions on Iran, since the US was not willing to engage in 
diplomatic efforts with Iran. Due to disputes of the strategy towards Iran, the US did not have a 
significant impact on the policy of the EU in relation to Iran, in the period between 2003-2008 
(Meier, 2013:12-13). This, however, changed with the election of Obama as the new US 
president. The US still pushed the EU for imposing tougher sanctions outside the UN framework, 
but now opened up for direct diplomatic talks with Iran, which correspond to the general strategy 
of the EU. The strategic cooperation between the EU and the US meant an increased American 
influence on the EU’s sanction strategy against Iran. France were especially influenced by the 
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US’s strategy of unilateral sanctions, because of the strong common American and French 
interests in Saudi-Arabia and the Gulf states (Appendix 4:5-6). The US also increased its 
influence on the policy of the UK towards Iran, which was mainly centred on the historical 
relations between the US and the UK. Germany was, however, not influenced by the US to the 
same degree, because of their conflictual approach to the use of force (Appendix 4:5-6). The 
Obama administration and the EU disagreed on whether or not to support a possible Israeli 
military strike on the nuclear facilities. The EU even rejected to use military threats as a coercive 
tactic in the diplomatic talks (Alvaro & Tabrizi, 2014:19). Furthermore, the US proposed to 
impose a comprehensive trade embargo on Iran in 2012, which the EU decided to reject. The US, 
however, convinced the EU to impose financial sanctions on Iran’s banking system, which, to 
some degree, had a similar impact on Iran’s ability to trade, as the proposed trade embargo 
would had (Meier, 2013:16). 
  
The role of the EU in the negotiations was during the Bush administration, indirectly shaped in 
contrast to the US’ strategy. This changed during the Obama administration, where the policies 
of the EU were highly influenced by the US’ strategy. There are, however, some limits to the 
US’s impact on the behaviour of the EU. The toughness of the sanctions and the threat of use of 
force, still divide the two actors approach to Iran. In relation to the EU-3, it was primarily France 
that was influenced because of common interests with the US in the region. Overall, the role of 
the EU in the negotiations with Iran has been highly dependent on the US’ strategy. 
 
6.3.2. Russia and China 
Russia and China’s impact on the behaviour of the EU is concentrated around the critique of 
imposing independent economic and financial sanctions against Iran. Both countries demanded 
that the EU, through a UN framework, had to use dialogue and multilateral sanctions in the 
negotiations, and have been critical towards the strategic cooperation between the EU and the US 
(Alvaro & Tabrizi, 2014:15). Furthermore, Russia and China have been very critical towards 
some of the EU’s member states’ willingness to threaten Iran with military action. They have 
pushed the EU to reject any proposal regarding this and argued that it would be 
counterproductive for the EU to adopt these stands (Meier, 2013:8). Even though Russia and 
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China have also had a non-military approach to the negotiations, it is very uncertain whether they 
have been a part of shaping the EU’s preferences towards Iran. Russia is cooperating militarily 
with Iran, and in April 2015, they announced that they would sell an advanced missile system to 
Iran. The EU stated that this would be a counterproductive factor in the negotiations, that could 
have a negative impact in the Middle East (Kozhanov, 2015:2). While the EU might agree with 
Russia and China on the restrain of the use of force in the case of Iran, it can be argued that this 
is not a norm they normally share in global affairs. Russia used military force in 2014 against 
Ukraine in the Crimea conflict, and against Georgia in 2008 (Larsen, 2014:7). China has 
threatened to use force against Japan and Taiwan, in order to secure its territorial integrity 
(Hoyng, Wagner & Zand, 2013). At the same time, the EU decided to impose sanctions on Iran, 
despite critique from China and Russia, who subsequently did not leave the negotiations. It can 
therefore be argued that Russia and China have had little impact on the role of the EU in the 
nuclear negotiations, compared to the influence that the US relationship with EU has had. 
 
6.4. The Diplomatic Approach of the EU 
This section outlines the EU’s diplomatic approach to the Iranian nuclear issue. Their approach 
will be analysed on the basis of official statements of the EU, and through the positions of 
different scholars in regard to the importance of the EU in the negotiations. 
 
In order to analyse and comprehend the EU’s diplomatic approach to the negotiations of Iran’s 
nuclear programme, we examine some of the EU’s official statements on the issue. The official 
goal of the EU is an agreement, that would prohibit Iran from obtaining nuclear weapons, and at 
the same time respect Iran’s right to keep a peaceful nuclear programme, in conformity with the 
Non-Proliferation Treaty (EEAS, 2015A). The EU claims that it has always tried to reach this 
agreement through constructive negotiations (EEAS, 2012A). This is done through diplomatic 
efforts, with the High Representative as the designated negotiator for the EU and the EU-3 
(EEAS, 2012A)(EEAS, 2015A). This diplomatic approach becomes further apparent when 
looking at the EU Strategy against the proliferation of WMD, where it is stated that in order to 
prevent the proliferation of WMD, the EU should pursue multilateral agreements and cooperate 
closely with key partners (EEAS, 2012B). This diplomatic approach is evident in the case of 
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Iran, where, according to the Security Strategy, the EU prefers an approach based on dialogue in 
order to rebuild confidence in the relationship between Iran and the rest of the international 
community (Council, 2009:18). Should Iran, however, chose to advance with their nuclear 
programme, it will have consequences in their relationship to the EU (Council, 2009:18). The 
combination of this is what the EU calls the dual-track approach, which entails a combination of 
dialogue and increased pressure in order to reach an agreement with Iran (Council, 2009:18). 
In the EU Strategy against the proliferation of WMD and the Security Strategy, that the EU to a 
large degree relies on diplomatic solutions. In order to get different perspectives, the next section 
will look at how some scholars describe their position on the EU’s diplomatic approach to the 
negotiations of Iran’s nuclear programme. 
 
According to Meier (2013) the EU is paramount in preventing the case from escalating (Meier, 
2013:3). He argues their importance was, however, only evident during the first phase of the 
negotiations, when the important objective was preventing an escalatory development (Meier, 
2013:3). In line with this, Eoin O’Driscoll (2015) argues that it was the EU, by virtue of their 
diplomatic and mediating efforts, that broke the different deadlocks along the way, and thereby, 
was paramount in keeping Iran at the table. Had the EU not done this, the negotiations may very 
well have escalated, turning to confrontation (O’Driscoll, 2015). The EU was, however, due to 
the lack of internal coherence and leadership, not able to develop an independent solution to the 
issue (Meier, 2013:3). This meant that the EU was dependent on US involvement in the 
negotiations and had to align with a US strategy against Iran, which undermined the independent 
strategy of the EU (Alcaro & Tabrizi, 2014:18). 
Cornelius Adebahr (2014) argues, that the EU-3 had three goals, when they entered the 
negotiations (Adebahr, 2014). First of all, they wanted to demonstrate the value of diplomacy, 
rather than military action. Secondly, they wanted to make a case for effective multilateralism, 
something that they are generally committed to in international affairs (EEAS, 2015C). Lastly, 
they wanted to earn a greater global role, by taking the reigns in the Iranian negotiations, at a 
time where the US were busy dealing with Iraq and Afghanistan (Adebahr, 2014). All three of 
these goals have been an apparent success, especially when looking at the Joint Plan of Action 
from 2013, and the framework deal agreed on in Lausanne this year. These two results greatly 
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bolster the eligibility of the multilateral approach the EU endorses, and hereby the EU as a global 
actor to be reckoned with (Adebahr, 2014). A critique of this is that the progress in the 
negotiations was highly determined by domestic factors in the US and Iran, and it was first when 
Obama and Rouhani came to power, that the strategy of the EU became successful (Alcaro & 
Tabrizi, 2014:18). 
The multilateral EU/EU-3+3 approach to solving the issue is a particular European approach, and 
the EU benefits greatly from it, because one of the major strengths of the EU is capitalizing on 
the EU-3 countries different relations to Iran (Adebahr, 2014). It is, in other words, the EU that 
has defined the very framework of the diplomatic negotiations. By claiming responsibility and 
taking action, with Catherine Ashton leading the negotiations on behalf of the EU/EU-3+3 
(Adebahr, 2014), the EU has made a deal possible by offering a different approach, other than 
bilateral negotiations or military intervention. A critique of this multilateral approach is, that the 
EU-3 countries have their own interests in relation to Iran, other than the goal of non-
proliferation. The EU-3’s interests in trade, energy security and stability in the Middle East have 
thus affected their position, and through uploading, also the EU’s (Alcaro & Tabrizi, 2014:18). 
Janne Christensen (2015) supports this critique by stating that the different members inside the 
EU have complicated the approach to the negotiations, ultimately sending mixed signals to Iran 
(Appendix 1:4-5). The different actors may contribute with their different relations to Iran, but a 
lack of coherence prevents the EU from capitalizing on this. Kienzle, however, argues that the 
format imposed by the EU has been a positive one. He argues that the coalition has prevented an 
escalation of the issue, because it has been able to work together for such a long period of time. 
This should be accredited to the EU, because they have been focused on keeping the diplomatic 
channels to Iran open throughout the whole period (Kienzle, 2013:52). Furthermore, the EU’s 
diplomatic negotiations with Iran facilitated the US to reopen negotiations with Iran, after 30 
years of diplomatic stalemate (Alcaro & Tabrizi, 2014:16). At the same time, the EU also 
showed, throughout the case of Iran, that they were able to take an autonomous stance, which 
subsequently led to the use of sanctions outside a UN framework (Kienzle, 2013:52). 
Janne Christensen (2015) remains critical towards the impact of the EU’s diplomatic approach, 
arguing that the Iranians have not been impressed by the abilities of the EU as a mediator, which 
has ultimately led to bilateral negotiations between the US and Iran (Appendix 1:8). In relation to 
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this, Joseph Bahout (2015) argues that even though the negotiations take place in a multilateral 
format, in reality, the actors do not act collectively, since there is a lack of trust between the 
actors of the EU/EU-3+3 (Appendix 4:3). He argues, that while aiming for a multilateral format 
is admirable, the US is simply too powerful an actor, in international politics, to be kept from 
having its own agenda (Appendix 4:3). This entails that the overall political line is actually 
drawn in what is largely bilateral negotiations between the US and Iran. Bahout attributes this to 
the fact that the relationship between the US and Iran, after the nuclear issue is solved, is very 
important to both parties, and the US therefore includes this interest in their talks with Iran 
(Appendix 4:3). 
 
The diplomacy of the EU has been characterized by a strong commitment to multilateralism, in 
order to prevent an escalation of the case, which could lead to the use of military force. The 
negotiations take place in a format introduced by the EU, and thus, it is the merit of the EU, that 
the negotiations are still ongoing. The diplomatic approach changed character, when the EU 
began to impose individual sanctions on Iran, outside the UN framework. The EU, however, still 
managed to keep up their diplomatic relationship with Iran, and lead the multilateral 
negotiations, while imposing their own sanctions. The diplomatic approach of the EU has been to 
facilitate, coordinate and mediate the coalitions common goal of preventing Iran from obtaining 
nuclear weapons. The EU therefore changed their diplomatic approach from preventing 
escalation, to a dual-track diplomatic strategy. Furthermore, the EU enabled the first bilateral 
negotiations between Iran and the US in 30 years. The diplomatic approach of the EU has been 
challenged by a lack of internal coherence, separate member states individual interests, the US’s 
own diplomatic strategy, and Iran’s willingness to negotiate. 
 
Our examination of the diplomatic approach of the EU, economic sanctions and relations with 
the other actors involved, gives an indication of what role the EU has played in the negotiations. 
In relation to Rosamond’s three circumstances that determine a protective role for the EU, 
combined with our findings in the previous analysis, it can be argued that the EU have strengthen 
its protective role. First, there was a particular global challenge present, in terms of a violation of 
an non-proliferation norm, which the EU highly regards, in a region where the EU, and the EU-3 
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have extensive interests. Second, the EU’s large economic capacity, legitimacy as a multilateral 
institution, and its political capabilities through representation of 28 European states, made it 
preferable for the member states to impose sanctions on Iran through the EU. And third, the other 
external actors recognized the EU as a key negotiator that also utilized sanctions as a conflict 
management tool. 
 
6.5. Sum-up 
The nature of the EU as a foreign policy actor, based on the arguments put forth by Michalski 
(2005) and Manners (2002), is that the foreign policy power of the EU has a normative basis. To 
which degree this allows them to be an independent actor, with power in international affairs, is 
contested. We conclude that it is desirable for the EU to engage in the Iranian nuclear talks, as 
this allows them to forward their norms, values and principles of non-proliferation. In doing so, 
they strengthen their legitimacy and impact as an actor in foreign affairs. 
Our analysis of the EU’s sanctions against Iran gives us an understanding of the rationale behind 
the sanctions, providing a perspective on how the EU perceives its own role in international 
affairs. The analysis demonstrated a shift from a rationale based on resource denial, to one based 
on compellence and normative communication, which indicates that the EU is ready to 
strengthen its protective role. Three circumstances allowed the EU to fulfil this role; the violation 
of the non-proliferation norm, the EU’s capability, as a result of politics of scale and the 
recognition of the EU as a global actor. The strategy of the EU has been highly affected by the 
US’ strategy, whereas the strategy of China and Russia have not been influential. The strategy of 
the EU was shaped in opposition to the US during the Bush administration, but aligned more 
when Obama was elected president. The strategies of the EU and the US are, however, still 
conflictual in terms of the toughness of the sanctions, and the threat of the use of force. 
The EU’s focus on multilateralism has ensured that the Iranian nuclear issue did not escalate 
further. They have managed to keep the negotiations going and thereby detained the actors from 
the use of force. The diplomatic approach of the EU has also facilitated the reopening of 
diplomatic relations between the US and Iran. This approach, however, is challenged by issues of 
coherence and different interests of the EU-3 countries. 
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7. Discussion 
In this section, we discuss our findings from the analysis, in order to determine the role of the 
EU. The discussion is based on the interests of the EU-3, the diplomatic approach of the EU, and 
their normative basis for foreign policy. Tying the conclusions of our analysis together, we seek 
to discuss the different roles that the EU can play in the negotiations on Iran’s nuclear 
programme.    
 
The role of the EU in the negotiations is undoubtedly influenced by the EU-3’s own interests and 
values. France, the UK and Germany have been consistent in uploading their own interests to the 
EU level, in order to gain influence and shape the role of the EU as a global actor. This raises the 
question of whether the EU is just an instrument for its member states to conduct their own 
policies, or if the role of the EU is to conduct a common foreign policy on behalf of its member 
states. 
France, the UK and Germany might share the same common norm of non-proliferation of WMD, 
but their preferences in order to achieve this differ, because of their individual interests. This 
results in different uploads to the EU level, which indicates an intergovernmental dimension of 
the role of the EU. A lack of internal coherence might create a crisis of legitimacy for the EU, in 
the negotiations, by sending mixed signals to Iran. An example of this is that while the EU 
rejects any use of force, France and the UK advocates that it may become necessary. This 
perspective is challenged by the argument that the role of the EU is to manage different 
preferences, interests and values in its conflict management strategy, and that this is something it 
is able to do without losing effectively and legitimately. By including the HR in the negotiations, 
the EU can create the necessary internal coherence to conduct effective diplomacy on behalf of 
28 member states. Following this, the EU is able to include the member states’ individual 
relations to Iran to its advantage. The strong political ties between Germany and Iran, together 
with France’s willingness to impose sanctions, and the UK’s strong ties to US policies, may 
enable the EU to utilize effective diplomacy and sanctions in the negotiations. Whether influence 
from the EU-3 is an advantage or disadvantage in the negotiations, highly depends on how the 
EU utilizes diplomacy and whether they succeed to create coherence. The EU has attempted to 
maintain its legitimacy as a negotiator, both internally and externally, through an EU/EU-3 
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constellation. This has been combined with the different approaches of the EU-3 into a 
comprehensive and effective strategy, consisting of a mix of multilateral diplomacy and tough 
economic sanctions. 
Whether the EU’s diplomatic contribution to the negotiations has been more or less positive, 
varies from position to position. Some of the arguments presented was, that the decisive, political 
decisions are made bilaterally, between Iran and the US. This, in turn, leaves the EU with a 
facilitator or mediator role. Other arguments presented, accredit them much more importance, in 
sheer diplomatic value. This diplomatic role differs from “just” being a facilitator, in the sense 
that the EU is not only able to bring everyone to the table, but also to keep them there. In relation 
to this, their role as diplomats in the negotiations may in fact be an extension of their politics. In 
any case, separating diplomacy from politics seems difficult and the question is rather how much 
they let their politics dictate by the other actors. The EU’s actual political weight is in their 
sanctions, which were imposed autonomously, outside the UN framework. This argument does, 
however, not affirm the politically strategic role of the EU. Even though the sanctions are ‘EU 
sanctions’, they are conducted in relation to the US’ sanctions, and are thereby not undeniable 
evidence of the EU’s autonomous political decision making. On the other hand, being interlinked 
with the policies of the US does not necessarily take away political weight from the EU, but 
rather indicates that their political role is afforded them by the US. 
 
In light of this, the role of political strategist might not be the most evident, regarding the 
contribution of the EU in the negotiations. It is noteworthy, that this focus on political decisions 
might belittle the importance of the diplomatic mediator role. The EU/EU-3+3 constellation is a 
very heterogeneous group of actors. Looking at the UN Security council, they are criticised for 
their lack of efficiency, due to the fact that they are often politically opposed to each other. 
While the objective of non-proliferation in the case of Iran does constitute a common political 
goal, it is possible that there is a spill over of other interests, and thereby other conflicts, among 
the negotiators. This aligns with the assumption of Joseph Bahout (2015) that there is a lack of 
trust and cohesion between the EU/EU-3+3, making it difficult to cooperate (Appendix 4:3). 
This leaves a space for the EU to carve out a role as the bridge-building diplomat, among the 
negotiators. A role that is crucial, if a deal is to be reached. 
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The political weight of the EU might improve their hard power capabilities, and strengthen their 
role as a global security actor. It can therefore be debated whether the EU’s increased use of hard 
power capabilities is on behalf of, or an supplement to, the normative basis of the EU’s foreign 
policy. The EU seeks to combine its diplomatic approach with economic sanctions in their 
strategy, and thereby diffuse their norms through hard power tools. While the EU’s power in 
foreign policy is still normatively based, their use of hard power capabilities makes it more 
difficult to distinguish between the EU, and the US as global actors. 
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8. Conclusion 
The EU is a complex actor, which makes it difficult to comprehensively cover its role in its 
entirety. The role of the EU consists of a norm based diplomatic approach, combined with hard 
power capabilities. Following this argument, we established that it is desirable for the EU to 
engage in the Iranian nuclear negotiations because it gives the EU a possibility to strengthen its 
protective role and forward their norms, values and principles of non-proliferation of WMD. 
This is evident in the change in the EU’s rational basis behind their sanctions, which changed 
from resource denial to a strategy based on compellence and normative communication. With 
their multilateral approach, the EU’s diplomatic efforts in the negotiations have brought all the 
actors of the EU/EU-3+3, to the negotiation table, in order to reach an agreement. The EU has 
thereby acted as an effective facilitator, in the negotiations, as well as a mediating between the 
US and Iran, ending years of diplomatic stalemate between the two. 
The diplomatic approach of the EU is challenged by the lack of internal coherence due to 
different interests. Their role is shaped by the interests of the EU-3, which creates a duality in the 
foreign policy of the EU, in the sense that it both conducts a common foreign policy on behalf of 
its member states, and at the same time based on the individual foreign policy of its member 
states. The EU-3 has successfully influenced the EU in the negotiations, by uploading some of 
their interests. The UK and France have taken a tough stance in the negotiations, which they 
managed to upload to the EU level, resulting in tougher sanctions on Iran. Germany was critical 
towards the tougher stance, however, they managed to influence the EU, in terms of a 
multilateral framework and a non-military approach, in the negotiations. 
The role of the EU is also shaped by the actions of the US, which makes distinguishing their role 
from each other complicated. The EU has succeeded in forwarding the norm of not using 
military force as a threat, to the other actors in the negotiations. At the same time, the EU has 
imposed autonomous economic sanctions on Iran, strengthening their role as a protector, which 
indicates that they do not rely solely on normative power. The role of the EU can be 
characterized as having a decisive political role through their use of sanctions, while being a 
facilitator and coordinator, accrediting them that the nuclear programme is being negotiated. The 
EU mediates between the other negotiators, and their diplomatic efforts are in this sense what tie 
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together an otherwise incoherent and untrusting group. They are thereby paramount in making it 
possible to reach an agreement, exclusively through diplomatic means. 
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9. Suggestion For Further Research 
As the details of the negotiations are classified at the moment, future research once they are 
made public would be a natural next step in relation to our analysis. 
The double representation of the EU-3 in the negotiations makes it relevant for us to examine the 
uploading process. The EU-3 are, in this project, perceived as the key players in the EU, it can, 
however, be argued that there is a disproportional focus on these actors, compared to the 
remaining 25 member states. We could also have emphasised the downloading process in 
general, in order to fully comprehend the complex process of coordinating the foreign policy of 
the EU. 
Another perspective is a deeper analytical research of how the EU utilizes and combines 
different tools in its conflict management strategy. The rationale behind the sanctions is 
examined, but we limit ourselves from a more comprehensive understanding of, the impact of the 
sanctions on Iran, and the EU member states. An analysis of the political, economic and 
humanitarian consequences of the EU sanctions on Iran, could question the role of the EU as a 
global actor. 
Another suggestion for further research might include a comparative focus on the EU’s conflict 
management. EU is currently in a dispute with Russia, due to the annexation of Crimea, and has 
imposed economic sanctions as a consequence. It could therefore be interesting to examine 
whether there are similarities in the EU’s conflict management strategies in the cases of Iran, and 
Russia. 
The roles of Russia and China in the negotiations are only briefly examined in the project. 
Further research on this topic could include a stronger focus on these actors behaviour in the 
negotiations, and how their political, economical, historical and military interests in Iran affects 
the negotiations. 
The regional context could also be further analysed in the project, most notably the opposition to 
the nuclear deal by the Saudis and Israelis, and how this affect the role of the EU in the region. 
Despite the apparent possibility of a comprehensive nuclear deal in June 2015, Israel has still 
threatened to use military force against Iran. Furthermore, Saudi-Arabia, along with Egypt and 
the Gulf States, has created a new military league in the Middle East. These developments could 
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be further examined in order to discuss how the EU’s policy towards Iran, affects the power 
constellation in the Middle East. 
If the negotiations lead to a final nuclear deal in June 2015, it can arguably be perceived as a 
success of how direct diplomacy through a UN-framework, together with tough economic 
sanctions, can strengthen a global non-proliferation of WMD. 
The case of North Korea’s nuclear programme has some similarities with the case of Iran, 
making it a possible case, when analysing the extent to which the conflict management of the EU 
is a universal model, or whether it is highly dependent on the context and other actors involved. 
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Appendix 1	  	  
Interview with Janne Bjerre Christensen, the 3rd May 2015	  	  
S: Simon 
P: Peter	  
J: Janne Bjerre Christensen	  	  
00:00 - 02:50 
Smalltalk in danish	  	  
02:50	  
P: The first thing we like to discuss is a general outline of the development that you seen in the 
conflict from when the negotiations about the nuclear program started and up to where the 
negotiations are now, so how do you see the EU’s role in these negotiations, because it started 
out as a US led project, but now the EU’s has imposed it’s own sanctions?	  	  
J: Are we talking about the sanctions or are we talking about the nuclear negotiations as they 
started out in 2002-3, which one?	  	  
P: The negotiations about the nuclear programme..	  	  
J: Because it started out as negotiations, and then the sanctions came later. So we talk about the 
nuclear development in the nuclear negotiations. Well I mean as you probably already know in 
2002 it was brought… there was basically an exile Iranian community who brought to the world 
tension that Iran had some kind of concealed nuclear facilities. And after then the negotiations 
started in 2003, with the EU-3 at that time. And they continued for quite a while and basically 
you have a period from 2003-5 where Iran is mainly negotiation with the EU about the content of 
the nuclear programme, about the content of the surveillance of the nuclear programme including 
you know whether Iran should…  I think actually what happened what happen straight after they 
discovered the nuclear programme was that Iran sieged its nuclear enriched uranium in the 
facilities and they even.. I think temporarily adopted the additional protocol as well, so I mean 
that they did quite a few measures in order to show their good intentions and will. And their 
ability to somehow make some kind of compromises with the EU. But the problem at that time 
was that basically the EU did not want to allow Iran to have any nuclear programme at all. So 
that was where it ended up in 2005 that even at a time where Iran was quite willing to make 
some kind of compromise, I think at least through my reading that EU pushed to far. They didn’t 
want them to have basically any kind of nuclear programme.	  
 	  
05:37	  
P: Why do you think that they didn’t want them to have any programme?	  	  
J: Well, hm… Because there wasn’t that kind of trust at that time, they just didn’t trust the 
Iranians. And of course that had a lot of repercussions internally in Iran.. I mean if you think at 
the big picture it had a lot of repercussions in… I can’t remember whether it was in the spring 
2005.. Iran restarted it enrichment, it restarted its program and they did that actually while 
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Khatami was still president but it also had the kind of repercussions internally that.. I think it was 
part of the reason why the Ayatollah Khamenai put his support behind Ahmadinejad to become 
the new president of Iran, because he had that very confrontational stands that they wanted that 
time, they where pissed off with the Europeans, they had tried hard to reach some kind of 
compromise, they had failed to do so, they felt that they where misunderstood by the West and 
they said well fuck it then, you know lets bring a guy like Ahmadinejad to the power, who would 
speak about Holocaust denial and what not. And so you have a long period after that where 
basically nothing changed about the nuclear programme in Iran. Okay, I mean they restarted the 
enrichment, but then the UN Security Council decided to put the case of the Iranian nuclear 
programme to the UN Security Council. And then you start having the UN Security Council’s 
resolutions against Iran, I think its in the beginning of 2006 – I cant remember if its February or 
March, but there are several resolutions imposed on Iran including some kind of sanctions, 
mainly on the nuclear programme, but also touching other issues, and as things move on, I mean 
there is a kind of… As soon as Obama comes on, I mean 2006 and 2007 there is an 
intensification of the conflict in the sense that Israel and US also threatens Iran with military 
attacks on the nuclear facilities, not because they can actually discover anything new.. Basically I 
mean if you have to make an overall statement what is happening after the 2002, you cant not 
point to anything that Iran has done after that, at least very few things, where they have been 
breaking trust or breaking somehow.. you know.. created new things that would definitely point 
at Iran having a nuclear weapon programme. But never the less when Obama is becoming 
president, he wants to restart the negotiations, he wants to show that he is a man of diplomacy, 
he is not like Bush and bla bla bla. And then the timing of the Tehran side is getting very bad, 
and… so I think its in the… in March 2009 I think that’s when Obama has his Nowruz speech to 
the Iranian people where he tries to reach out an tell you know we have a relationship with Iran 
and bla bla bla.. but then in June 2009 Ahmadinejad is re-elected and people gets very very 
angry, and says there must be some kind of fraught.. and you have a huge amount of 
demonstrations and people getting killed on the streets. And you have this intensive violence that 
you haven’t seen since the revolution in the beginning of the 1980’s. At that time Obama puts on 
the table a kind of proposal for an agreement and that time the Iranians are basically not able to 
respond, so they don’t respond… And then in spring 2010 the demonstrations stops and Iran is 
beginning to be able to restart negotiations, at that time Obama and the Europeans as well 
they’ve decided on imposing sanctions on Iran. So when Iran was finally ready, the others had 
already left the table. And then you have the deal, you have the Tehran declaration in May 2010 
where Iran actually get to some kind of agreement with Brazil and Turkey, but that whole thing 
is just wacked off the table.	  
 	  
10:24	  
S: Why do you think that is..	  
 	  
J: Because the US and Europe had already decided on imposing sanctions and they had gone so 
far with the sanctions already… But it was Obama that originally had asked Brazil and Turkey to 
have that kind of negotiations with the Iran. So of course Iran felt betrayed and the Brazilian and 
Turkish leaders was pretty pissed off by that and then you have the sanctions imposed and 
increased but the US and the Europeans up to 2012.. And then the next big breakthrough is when 
Rohani becomes president in 2013 and he does so on a very clear agenda that the foreign policy 
is the most important. And as you know Rohani was also part of the negotiations team from 
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2003-5. Just like the current foreign minister Zarif was part of the team that time. Basically what 
he tries to is to restart what ever kind of negotiations was going on. But of course in the mean 
time they have done whatever they could to develop the nuclear programme and show the world, 
well we don’t care about your sanctions we don’t care what you think about us, we can do the 
this by our self. I mean okay if you wont let us by these 20 % enriched uranium for our cancer 
reactor in Tehran, we will do it our self. So you have this kind of increase where Iran definitely 
constantly enhanced the programme without breaking the rules, but going to the limit. And that 
of course makes the negotiations tougher, because Iran’s nuclear programme is much more 
develop now than it was in 2005, that was Zarif says all the time, you know you could have had a 
better deal in 2005. At that time we had 200 centrifuges, now we have 20.000, of course we can’t 
go back, so that I think was the overall picture, but there is of course another thing that is 
important. That is in 2003 actually Iran tried… have you heard about the secret deal where did 
had like a secret proposal to the Americans, have you heard about that…	  	  
S: I think I have heard about that..	  
 	  
J: Basically through the Swiss Embassy in Switzerland, they send a proposal to US.. that is really 
very interesting because they was seeking a bargain.. that was just after Saddam was toppled that 
was just after Taleban had been toppled, Saddam had been toppled, of course Iran felt the heat so 
that time they… I can’t find it to you… I can find the entire proposal for you, but they put a lot 
of stuff on the table, they said that they would siege the support to Hezbollah and Hamas, they 
would even recognize some kind of two state solution in Israel/Palestine.. They needed the right 
to nuclear programme, but they where willing to give up on a lot other stuff. And at that time, the 
Bush administration, their only respond was we don’t speak with the evil. So they where caught 
in their own action of evil stuff thinking that they where basically conquering the entire Middle 
east, and that they didn’t had any need for the Iranians and I think what I am trying to say with 
all this is that there have been many mistakes on both sides of the table. I think you should read 
Trita Parsi’s ‘A single role of the Dice’, which is an excellent book about the diplomacy between 
the US and Iran, and about all the mistakes been made and he writes about this secret proposal.	  
 	  
14:30	  
P: How did the EU positioned it selves in these negotiations at the time, where they even 
considered as an equal partner in the negotiations or was it just the US took the lead?	  
 	  
J: After Rohani?	  	  
P: Yes	  	  
J: I think definitely the US have been taking the lead and I think what happened was when the 
EU imposed sanctions on Iran, that really hurt them. Obviously for economic reasons, but also as 
much for cultural reasons because they feel that they are much closer to Europe than to anybody, 
and there has been lot of historically and cultural links between Iran and France, Germany, 
England and what ever. But they also felt that they at that time definitely Europe sieged to be an 
independent actor, somehow negotiation in good faith and they saw this basically where the 
Europeans just followed the US what to do at this time, what we can do is just to go and 
negotiate directly with the US because they are basically the one deciding in any case, so I think 
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it was out of some kind of course obviously frustrating for the EU, that they decided to open up 
for some kind of backchannel for negotiation with the US.	  	  	  
15:55	  
S: Has the internal disputes primarily by the big three in Europe, in relation to the sanctions, 
maybe been concerned with supporting the US, maybe the UK could lean more to the US 
sanction policy	  	  
J: Yeah particular the French has been supporting the US very strongly and they have been the 
most toughest one in Europe in terms of what they wanted to do with Iran. UK as well of course 
has been supporting the US, but I think partly, it is not so much within the EU-3, as much as in 
the EU as such. Particular the southern European countries, Greece, Italy, Spain, they have been 
closer also financially to Iran. Particular Greece, I can’t remember the figures, but they have 
imported a lot of Iranian oil. So I think definitely there was something disenchantment between 
these people.	  	  
17:01	  
P: Do you see any interests that the EU might have in sanctioning Iran, besides the obvious 
internationally security question of the nuclear programme. Do you see any other reason in why 
they want to have the negotiations draw out the way they have?	  	  
J: Not so sure about that. I really think that Ahmadinejad touched a lot of raw nerves’ in the EU. 
I mean the Holocaust denial at the Holocaust conference that was just so stupid. Particular in 
Germany they were very very offended. I think Merkel even called him the new Hitler at the 
time. People were really pissed off. So if you looked at it strictly from the nuclear perspective, 
what Iran did at that time, it was not that bad. But what else was added to it by the stupidity of 
Ahmadinejad. Just to put it frankly, that just made any kind of negotiation very difficult. Even 
the diplomats within the EU administration, who had been having some sort of critical dialogue 
with Iran for a long time. That goes back to 92, and going on for 10 years, and what have gone 
right on track even in terms of trade agreement, stuff like that, what were they supposed to do? 
How could they advocate that kind of diplomacy with Iran? So in that sense it is not that 
surprising that the EU have been very offended and not been seeing it as an opportunity. Off 
course there are also a lot of other issues. The human rights stuff has been a major issue and that 
have also always been a part of the EU’s concerns with Iran. And that also deteriorated during 
Ahmadinejad presidency. So in that sense whatever you had or whatever a kind of opening 
during Khatami presidency it all seemed to close down basically.	  	  
19:31	  
P: Do you think that they pursued other political objectives or goals than just the nuclear 
programme with these sanctions?	  	  
J: What would that be?	  	  
P: I mean for instance Human Rights	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S: It could also be in relation to IS right now and the Iranian relationship to Iraq	  	  
P: Stabilizing the region	  	  
J: Of course, I mean sanctions are always tighten up with other stuff and at least some of the 
sanctions right now, I cannot remember exactly but the EU put sanctions on Iran to what extent 
they also involves human rights related issue. But it is very obvious that the unilateral sanctions 
from the US have problem with them because that they are like a spider web. So they are 
concerned with nuclear issue, but also list a lot of other stuff like supporting terrorist human 
rights violation etc. This also means it is hard to get out of the sanctions, to lift them. Even if the 
nuclear programme just basically disappeared tomorrow, you would still have a lot of stuff broad 
in against the Iranians. You would basically need, in order to succeed, a new government, which 
is just not any kind of Islamic republic. The criteria success, especially for the US, have been 
very high and also intertwined which makes it very muddy. And some of the EU sanctions are 
also related to the human rights issue. But I think one of the problems with the EU is that it is 
very difficult to have a consistent foreign policy against Iran and that have been the difficulty. 
There has been a lot of internal discussion in the US as you asked me about previously. For 
example the EU parliament has made a couple of resolutions against Iran and some of the 
toughest voices in the EU sound almost like Israel. That is as tough as they get, and then you 
have somebody else who wants to get back on the track to a critical dialogue. I Think the EU has 
sent some kind of mixed messages as well.	  	  
22:08	  
P: You think that it will be possible for Iran to accommodate the criteria’s with the current 
regime they have?	  	  
J: Yes I think that they do. Well that depends on what we talk about. The EU sanctions 
definitely. They could be lifted, and I think that’s a part of the negotiations now. The EU 
sanctions would be lifted very soon. Then you have the UN Security Council resolutions which 
are primarily related to the nuclear issue, which makes it a bit trickier. But that’s a part of the 
negotiations as well. Of the US sanctions that’s a whole different story because of the criteria of 
success involved, enshrining them. But also as you know some of them have to go through the 
congress and they are just against any kind of sanctions lifting. They even want to impose new 
sanctions right now. So in that sense it is a different story. Off course what Obama could do is 
have a kind of waver to suspend the sanctions on a temporary basis. Of course Iran would ask 
what after Obama? Then they can re-impose sanctions straight away.	  	  
23:39	  
P: We might just touched upon it actually, but what do you see as the main problem right now, 
on both sides, in terms of being able to end these negotiations in the near future. Finding a 
permanent solution?	  	  
J: Well the sanctions are and may just be a sticking point. I think the problem is the sanction has 
become a policy in itself and they are not any longer at least a measure to get to some kind of 
resolution . they are basically standing in the way of finding a solution and that Is definitely a 
problem. So one of the question is basically that the UN sanctions is a sticking point, the Iranian 
6	  
insist they have to be lifted straight away and then you have the us sanctions which will be a 
major problem, then you have had the questions of the extent of the nuclear programme. How 
many centrifuges and what kind of quality should they be allowed. Now they are close to 20.000. 
the p5+1 started with a 1000 and it seems to what I can gather as if they try to find a kind of 
compromise. Maybe 6 or 8 thousand centrifuges. And I think the Iranians would be able to deal 
with that, they have already seized Iranian enrichment up to 20 % and they are willing to discuss 
the number and other issues. The facilities in Iran at Arak have previously been very contested. 
And I think they are happy to compromise at that one. And then another sticky point has been the 
question of how long Iran should be on a special kind of surveillance. They would have to ratify 
the additional protocol which means that they would open up for more kind of severe kind of 
surveillance of the nuclear facilities. This is already under surveillance but I think it would open 
up for more unexpected visits. They are willing to do that but the question is for how long should 
they have this special attention from the international society. When will enough be enough in 
order for Iran to be accepted? So I think the Iranians would like this tyo stop around 10 years and 
the Americans would like 20 years. But I think that should be possible here to reach a 
compromise. But the sanctions are definitely a huge part of this.	  	  
26:41	  
S: But what do you think, from the Iranian government perspective, are the most important? The 
UN sanctions or the EU sanctions? But the US sanctions seems to be so far out that it might not 
be the first priority.	  	  
J: They want all the sanctions lifted straight away. But I think what they have to content with that 
some of the US sanctions will be lifting slowly. There will be a gradual sanctions lift and they 
would have to allow for a time frame where things also have to be ratified through the congress. 
That’s going to take them a while, just as the Iranian parliament has to ratify additional 
protocols. So some of all this legal stuff that is going to take a while in any kind of 
circumstances. One of the big problems has e been that what they say to Iran as yes we don’t 
doubt that Obama have good intention, but how much power does he have to enforce the policy 
that he is proposing. Is he going to be able to lift the sanctions? But they also say it is his 
problem and he needs to find a way to do that. But definitely the US sanctions is a sticking point.	  	  
28:10	  
P: Say they found a permanent solution and not just an interim deal, in the near future. What do 
you think the immediate sort of effect would be? Do you think that Iran would open up for 
finding solutions for other issues, such as human rights?	  	  
J: The first kind of consequence would definitely be a boost to the Iranian economy, much 
needed. They had been doing quite well. Basically the finance of Ahmadinejad was problematic. 
So some of the problems they have now are due to that kind of policy and not because of the 
sanctions. Some of it Rouhani have corrected but definitely a lot of European firms are basically 
just waiting to be able to go back to Iran. And as soon as an interim deal was signed in 
November 2014, you could see a huge group of delegations come to Iran in January and 
February 2015. Both diplomatic, but definitely kind of financial delegations trying to seek out 
the Iranian market too. That would be the first effect. Secondly it would open up for some kind 
of political opening. But there will be a backlash from the conservative forces in Iran. There are 
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definitely people who earn money from the sanctions, and want a status quo, who will be kind of 
homeless if all this was normalized. So of course there is internal opposition where they will 
push back where they are not in power. That would be the revolutionary guard. I don’t 
necessarily see that political prisoners would be released tomorrow. There might be a backlash 
temporarily. And then in a few years there would definitely be a kind of opening. It would add a 
lot of energy to the moderate agenda that Rouhani has. And then of course definitely in terms of 
regional issues. It will be a lot easier, as soon as you have created normalization, to invite Iran to 
the table when it comes to Syria, Iraq and Afghanistan. They were at the table previously, in 
Afghanistan for example. But the nuclear negotiations have stopped all that. So in that sense 
what Iran is seeking, through the negotiations, is an acknowledgment of its regional role. That 
would be possible and I still think the foreign policy issues will be easier to deal with than the 
domestic issues. There will still be drawbacks and backlashed.	  	  
31:41	  
P: Do you think internally it might be a boost to the current political regime in Iran, to the 
Rouhani position, in relations to the more conservatives.	  	  
J: Yes, definitely. Basically because it is the people who suffers from the sanctions. So it is not 
really the government, so, its not really the government, it’s not ajatollah rhamenei, its not the 
revo guard, I mean, theyre busy all over the place, right? And, it is basically the people who 
would be delivering their votes, and that is not just the question of rhohani and his presidency, 
but also about the parliamentary elections and the elections for the assembly of experts, which is 
next year in march. And the interesting thing about this, I won't get into too much criminology 
about a this, but the interesting thing… I mean, obviously, now, the parliament in Iran is very 
conservative, so, if you get the sanctions lifted, if you get a boost to rhohani, people would 
definitely support a more moderate parliament. But the other thing that is important is that the 
assembly of experts is basically that kind of unit that decides who is going to be the next 
supreme leader in Iran. So, that means from 2016 Ajatollah Rhameni is quite an old man, and 
another 8 years… if you have a moderate crew of people elected to the assembly of experts, that 
may affect who would become the supreme leader later on. And there is a huge difference 
whether its going to be an arch conservative, or some kind of troijka of several people… so…. 
Many things will be affected by this, and of course, on the contrary, if there is no deal, if they 
have to stop negotiating, that would…. Yeah… have certain consequences.	  	  
33:32	  
S: what is the power relation between the supreme leader Rhameni and rhouani?	  	  
J: I mean, as you know, in the end of the day it is still the supreme leader who decides, right? But 
I think they have quite a working understanding. And at least in terms of the current negotiations, 
I think one of the things that you really should notice is that ayatollah rhameni gives his support 
to the negotiating team. And he said that quite straight forward on several occasions. And I think 
rhouani is not reformist, he’s a moderate man, he has a good relationship to rhameni in many 
ways. And as far as I know, as far as what people told me during the last couple of weeks is that, 
well yes there is a huge opposition internally, but that’s controllable at the point, at the current 
level, and that was what people said. Basically because the supreme leader gives his support to 
rhouani. But if the negotiations fail, I think the supreme leader might just want to…. (pause)…. 
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What would you call that?..... “sacrifice” Rhouani. That may be part of it, you know? He may be 
forced to sacrifice his support, you know. To the negotiating team.	  	  
34:53	  
S: do you think the sanctions have had any affect on electing Rhouani which is more moderate 
than Ahmedinejad?	  
 
J: yeah, to some extend. I think people were ready in 2009 to elect another president. I know 
people were frustrated with Rhotami, back in 2005, they thought that the reformmovement wasnt 
really moving anywhere. Then you had the breakdown in the nuclear negotiations on top of 
everything. So at that time people thought: well, lets do something else, whatever. So they 
supported ahmedinejad. 4 years later I think everybody knew that, oh well, yes it could get worse 
than rhotami, by the way… this is quite obvious that this guy is… his financial policies, his 
populism, his confrontational stance against the rest of the world… I mean…. So I think at that 
time, people were ready to get somebody else in office. And then, of course (pause) internal 
political atmosphere from 2009 to 2013 was very bad. So, I think the difficulty with Iranian 
election is that, unless rohani had the support of the supreme leader, he wouldn’t have been 
allowed to be there. He wouldn’t have been allowed to be in the game, so somebody within the 
regime decided that this might a good idea… (mumler). How much that was a question of the 
sanctions, how much it was a question of…. (pause)… the corruption of the Ahmedinejad era as 
well. Its not just the sanctions as I said, it’s a lot of other issues that made the Iranian economy 
quite bad at the time.	  
But it was more like his agenda in the election was more on the economy and it was on foreign 
policy. He didn’t, he said something about “well, it might be quite a good idea to release people 
from the green movement”: but that hasn’t materialized at all, I mean, what he has been talking 
about later on has been the finances and the foreign policy.	  	  
37:05 
P: You talk about the opposite situation in terms of if the negotiations were to fail completely. If 
they came to a halt. Can you imagine what the EU would chose to do as a response, and what the 
americans would do. Do you think they would impose even more sanctions now? Or would they 
support Israel in military intervention?	  	  
J: I don’t think that they are for any kind of military intervention at all. I think.. Obama has said 
that quite clearly. I think there is a change actually in the American discourse on sanctions in 
Iran. Because, as you may know, the congress has (pause)…. Put forward some kind of bill, 
that’s supposed to impose sanctions on Iran by 24th of march, I think it is. And I think part of the 
discussions in the American… in the white house as well has been to say: people who support 
sanctions, basically support war against Iran. And that’s new to me. Because, what a lot of 
scholars have said over many years is: you know sanctions, its not producing the results you 
think they will produce, but worse still is, that it may lead to war, you know? Because at some 
point, what next are you supposed to do. If the Iranians don’t bend like, you know…. Its rather 
than seeing it as a way of avoiding war, it may be a step just before the war, right? And I think 
that has changed in the American discourse, in the sense that that is being recognized. Putting 
more sanctions on the table will definitely increase the risk of a war. Either by Israeli military, or 
by American military, and stuff like that. And Obama has been quite clear about that he is not  
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willing to go to war with Iran. That would be totally stupid, I think, as well. Particularly because 
there are you know, the smoking gun is just not there. If that was the case, it would be different. 
So, but I think, I mean, so military action? No not straight away, but I think the congress would 
impose new sanctions, yes. And I think they would deteriorate the situation even further. 
Definitely there has been some kind of opening between US and Iran, and since that hasn’t been 
the question since the revolution, right? So in that sense, its difficult to go back to square one. 
That’s what the Iranian foreign minister has said on many occasions: We will not go back to 
square one, but it would be definitely be very difficult for them to move on. And I think the 
uncertainty of the political situation internally in Iran would increase the volatility, the fragility 
of the Iranian government right now would increase..  they would be able to, you know, muddle 
(?) through somehow, I think… but it would increase the black market in Iran it wouldn’t be of 
any good, definitely. And you could see, I would fear that you would see the same kind of 
backlash from the conservative forces in Iran. You would see them reimpose themselves, just as 
they did in 2005, when the nuclear negotiations failed. So I think that, to me at least, the 
repercussions internally in Iran would be huge. Even if they had to paddle on, you know, and 
they would be there still… rohani, zarif, whatever. These Iranian parts have been quite clear 
about that they cant extend the negotiations, I mean, they have to find a solution now. So…	  	  
40:52 
P: Yeah. Perhaps move on to something a little bit different. If we look at the negotiation rounds, 
I don’t know how into the whole EU process in diplomatic relations you are, but (pause) do you 
have any knowledge about who was sort of, the main actors in the EU, during these negotiations 
with Iran? Who has sort of been the most prolific member states?	  
 
J: Im not sure they have been, really…. That’s not the… I think what's going on is that Iran is 
negotiating with the americans. And the EU somehow follow suit. I don’t think they play much 
of a mediating role, I don’t think, at least when you talk to the Iranians, they are not… you 
know… too impressed by the Europeans ability to negotiate in this kind of stuff, and you always 
see the… it’s Zarif and Kerry, right? These are the main actors. But just as much, I thnk the 
Chinese and Russia, they may not play a huge role either. I mean, so… but I mean, a part from 
that, I don’t have that much knowledge about the internal dynamics, I mean, what I know from 
people who knows more about the EU’s system, is that they are not impressed by the ability to 
put thing on the table and to reach some kind of deal. And I think the negotiations are basically 
been burdened by the fact that both parties. Both the p5+1 and Iran have been thinking that they 
came, that the other partner was too weak, that they would basically accept whatever they put on 
the table. So there has been a lot of going back and forth, and I don’t think the Europeans are 
better off than the americans in that sense. That’s at least what, I mean… since the EU sanctions 
were imposed, the Iranians has as I said previously just been looking towards the united states, 
because they were the ones calling the shots anyway.	  	  
43:06 
P: Yeah, well, I think we have gotten around most of it. We could talk about how these sanctions 
are being perceived in general, as (pause), as all of the primary tool in solving this whole 
conflict. Are people seeing the development there has been in the use of these sanctions as a 
success story? I mean, we do have an interim deal right now.	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J: who are the people you talk about?	  	  
43:39 
P: well, in general in the academic world, or in	  	  
J: amongst scholars? Or among European politicians, or among Iranian people? That’s a very 
different story, hehe.	  
 
43:50 
P: well, lets start with the European perspective.	  	  
J: I think the.. I mean, for what to me is wrong reasons, I think the European and the American 
perspective have been that: ok, because we imposed the sanctions, now we have pushed Iran to 
the table. And that kind of attitude has been part of the problem, because the Iranians don’t see it 
this way. So, but I think that if you speak to people, they would say: well yes, they are a success. 
But I mean, as I said, they have ceased a long time ago to be measures to reaching an agreement, 
because now they are basically standing in the way of reaching an agreement. So in that sense 
you could definitely questions the efficiency of the sanctions in this regard. Surely, yeah, the 
Iranians have been under pressure financially, well I think there are, what they always say is that 
there are so many other reasons why you would want this normalization of relations to come 
through. Its not because of the sanctions as such. And if you look at the nuclear programme as 
such, that has just continued to develop since 2006, when the first sanctions were imposed.	  	  
45:07	  
P: but if the sanctions are actually in the way of reaching an agreement, as you say, what are the 
reasons for the EU and the US to still pursue these sanctions? Is it just them being stubborn, 
sticking to their guns? Or is…	  	  
J: Yeah. I think so. But also because they are difficult to lift, right? I mean they put themselves in 
the situations as they painted themselves into a corner, its quite difficult to get out of this. Not so 
much the European sanctions, as I said, but both the UN sanctions and the US sanctions are very 
difficult for them to lift, so what are they going to offer the Iranians? And also of course, what 
they want is, it has taken them quite a while to build this structure of sanctions. So if the Iranians 
break their part of the agreement, they want to be able to reimpose sanctions straight away, 
basically. And you cannot have it both. You cannot keep the structure and everything in place, 
and at the same time reach peaceful agreement with Iran. Its very difficult. But of course, I mean, 
what the Iranians say, the perspective is definitely: well, yes the sanctions are hurting us, they are 
hurting the Iranian people, we suffer fro mthe sanctions, but we have been through things that are 
worse during the war with Irak. We had this kind of resistance economy. We can go through this. 
And they can, for a while. But because of the oil prices going down, they will face some 
difficulties rather soon. But and I can see their perspective when they say, well we have rohani, 
we have Zarif back in charge, they were the people who were dealing with… they were the 
negotiators at that time. So basically we had the same people back as were there 2003 to 2005, 
our position has not changed. The only thing the sanctions have done is to increase the hostility, 
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and to basically increase our nuclear programme. So they felt that they had a better position. 
They have more to bargain with, basically. And that’s, I mean, that is the facts. But (pause).	  	  
47:10 
S: do you think, as you said, the sanctions have affected a lot of the Iranian population, maybe in 
even the poorest population? Do you think that there are some kind of moral or normative, how 
do you say it… (pause)	  	  
47:28 
P:… consideration?	  	  
47:29 
S: yeah. Consideration from the EU and the US in these sanctions? Because maybe they are not 
exactly hitting the ones in power, but maybe more the population?	  	  
J: yeah, but I mean there have been kind another misunderstanding in this misperception that at 
least particularly I would say from the US side. But also you’ve seen the voices in Europe as 
well, that if we put pressure on the Iranian people, that was basically what some of these people 
said. That was what they wanted to do. Then in effect, Iranian people would rise against the 
Islamic republic and overthrow the Islamic republic, and to me that is a very dangerous analysis. 
It is a very misperceived but it is also extremely dangerous. As you have seen that is not was is 
going to happen. It has not happened it is not going to happen so far, so in that sense at least, 
some people might say yes, no we don not really intend to hurt the people, but some other people 
would say well yes that is exactly what we intend to do. But it has been very indirect, that is not 
stated in the sanctions of course, that we want the Iranian people to rise against the regime. But it 
has been part of, I mean, you have to remember that this came at the same time, or it just 
followed very closely to all the talk about regime change in Iran, that was basically what the 
Bush administration wanted to impose, some kind of regime change. So they supported the 
people of Iran in all sorts of ways, and that only created a lot more difficult for people being 
political active, or active in the civil society. Everything became much worse at that time, so I 
see the sanctions as some kind of, what do you call that, continuation of the regime change 
policy. In part at least.	  
49:19 
S: So that could be a goal also from the west?	  	  
J: Yes, not directly stated, never directly stated. But indirectly, yes definitely. But as I said..	  	  
49:32	  
S:  In your opinion it is not a goal that is realistic?	  	  
J: No, no, no, not at all. On the contrary I think what people do and I think we would do the same 
here, you know. If we were put under a lot of pressure from the entire world, we would stick to 
our guns, you know, We would stick to what we know. And you know, I think there is also a 
lesson learned in Iran, that while things can get worse, you know, we might think this is bad, but 
things can always get worse. So, I think in that sense it has also boosted some kind of 
nationalistic trend in Iran, at least during the Ahmadinijad era. But, I think there are a number of 
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reasons why it is not going to happen, I mean people have been through a revolution, they know 
that what comes out in the other end, might not be what they intended to, there are a lot of 
lessons to learn from the revolution. But also people have a very recent experience of the 
uprising in 2009-2010, which were very hardly brought down by military force, police forces, 
revolutionary guards etc. People know that the Islamic Republic will turn on the heat if there is 
any kind of, you know, arab spring kind of stuff. That is not going to happen. But I think most 
people in Iran, I mean that is at least what I experienced during the reform period, I mean I 
started working in Iran 1998, so during the reform period, what you had was a very changed 
notion of how change in Iran should be, and should come by basically. People seized believing in 
revolutionary change and started believing in democracy, all democratic incremental kind of 
changes that would be slower, but also more lasting. And I think a lot of the Iranian people still 
believe that, of course there is a great frustration, many young people would like the regime to be 
gone. But a lot of people they know that it is not the way that things should move forward. But I 
also think that, at least, a couple of years ago, when you talk to people they looked at Syria or 
they looked at Iraq, you know, just toppling somebody does not really bring about the right kind 
of changes. But I think particularly Syria, of course the Iranian people know that Iran has also 
been supporting the Syrian regime in climbing down on the demonstration, so you know, I don’t 
think that is the way forward.	  	  	  	  
52:05	  
P: Do you think it is realistic that it might, as you say, perhaps not only in a revolutionary way, 
but push the presidential elections in an even more moderate way, I mean they did get Rouhani 
as  a new president, a much more moderate president after the sanctions had been imposed. Do 
you think it is realistic we might get someone even more moderate than Rouhani?	  	  
J: Very difficult to tell. But all I can say is that it would in a longer run, this would definitely 
open up Iran. In many ways it would allow for different kind of voices, it would open up the 
domestic political scene, which is still quite tight and tense. Although things has changed, you 
know, there is still quite a stronghold. So in that sense yes I think I would slowly and gradually 
open up Iran in many ways. There would be definitely a lot of people trying to come down on it. 
Enforcing their power wherever they can, as you know the judiciary is still controlled by 
conservative forces, so you still have a lot of people being arrested for political reasons. Stuff 
that Rouhani really cannot do much about. So in that sense it is the entire system and institutions 
that have to change, but it is not going to change over night. So I mean the nuclear deal would 
be, definitely a step forward in many ways. Also because the Iranian people, what most people 
that I talked to, they liked Iran to be recognized in the world. Not as theorist or as a threat to the 
stability of the region, but as somebody who is peaceful basically and seeking a constructive 
dialog in the regional crisis as well.	  	  
53:55	  
S: Do you think it is realistic to, for Iran, to as you said earlier, to recognize the Israeli state, or 
Palestine as two states?	  	  
J: No not at the moment.	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54:10 
S: Because they are in a better position now?	  
 
J: Yeah, I don’t know. It is difficult to see. I mean, if there all of a sudden were a peace 
agreement, and that seems to be very far away right now, then it may change, who knows where 
Iran would stand at that point. I don’t see them as being the main obstructor of an Israeli peace in 
the negotiations, you know.  What you have seen in Iran, basically, and I think we have to 
remember that when we have all this talk about the Iranian threat, is that Iran’s foreign policy 
have been quite pragmatic, if you look at what they have been doing over the years, I mean. 
There will always be people saying, they are messing all about, intervening everywhere, they 
want to spread their revolution, well yes there are people who has that kind of rhetoric. But I 
don’t think that is what Iran has been doing. The reason why they are in Iraq know, is not really 
in some kind of Persian empire dream, you know, it is basically cause otherwise Baghdad would 
fall to die, and that is what they say at least.	  
 
55:26 
S: Just on a sidenote, I read, last week, an article about South African intelligence agency an 
Mossad having talked about that the Iranian didn’t have the capability to develop nuclear. I don’t 
know if you have read that too?	  
 
J: Yeah, yeah.	  
 
55:53 
S: Because I could not find anything to affirm it, so I just wanted to..	  
 
J: No but I mean that was off course  a big story in Tehran last week, the week before when it 
broke, I can not remember. I think it was Aljazeera that brought that up right?	  
 
56:07 
S: Yeah.	  	  
J: Was it also published in the Guardian?	  
 
56:10 
S: I think they have some relationship, Aljazeera and the Guardian.	  
 
J: So in that sense I doubt that the Guardian would release that unless they had some kind of 
confirmed information. But in itself it is not that suprising, in the sense that the previous head of 
Mossad, I cant remember his name right know, and I cant remember when he stopped being the 
intelligence, the head of the intelligence. But basically he had on previous occasions been 
speaking against Netanyahu, and said well we can not support this. We could not support it while 
I was the head of the intelligence, the head of Mossad. So in that sense it would not surprise me 
if that is what they said, but I mean I think that the story was that they basically put this on the 
table again, just after Netanyahu made his UN general assembly speech, where he was talking 
about the red line, we are just this far. But I mean since 2003 I don’t know, I can not count the 
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numbers of journalists phoning me up and saying, oh you know what Iranians are going to have a 
nuclear bomb in six months, the Israeli said so, you know. What is your comment? Is that not a 
huge risk, bla, bla, bla.. And that has happened, I don’t know how many times. And as you 
know, I mean, they are not really having a nuclear weapon at the moment. In that sense 
Netanyahu is.. Yes whatever, going of in some kind of direction on his own.	  
 
57:50 
P: There is an agenda.	  
 
J: It seems he is going to far right now, it seems that there is quite a lot of discontent in the 
American congress as well, and in Israel, not to talk about Iran of course. But it seems like this 
time he has actually gone that far that people is started seeing him as being obstructing 
everything. I think they have obstructing things for quite a while, but it have not been that 
obvious.	  	  
58:14 
S: Yeah, it seems like he may be jeopardizing the relationship to the Americans also know right?	  	  
J: Yes.	  	  
58:19 
P: Unless he is trying to chose a side, which is the republican side I guess.	  
 
J: Of course he is.	  
 
58:28 
S: Yeah, that could be dangerous.	  
 
58:31 
P: I think we got around, pretty much all the subjects we wanted to touch upon. So thank you 
very much for your time.	  
 
J: You are welcome. 
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Appendix 2 
 
Import and export of EU-3/Iran 
 
Source: 
http://exporthelp.europa.eu/thdapp/display.htm;jsessionid=6E968F7F35381ABB9109508EF4C8
62EA?page=st%2fst_Statistics.html&docType=main&languageId=en 
 
 
  Million Euro Source: Eurostat   
Year Import - France Import - Germany Import - UK 
2002 828 304 57 
2003 1047 272 44 
2004 1430 357 61 
2005 2163 423 56 
2006 2370 361 112 
2007 2450 496 94 
2008 2359 530 88 
2009 1000 491 233 
2010 849 854 218 
2011 1747 716 420 
2012 128 313 137 
2013 28 256 32 
2014 29 280 40 
Year Export - France Export - Germany Export - UK 
2002 1576 2236 633 
2003 2067 2678 685 
2004 2331 3573 649 
2005 2007 4361 672 
2006 1896 4110 628 
2007 1512 3596 579 
2008 1810 3920 509 
2009 1447 3782 415 
2010 1787 3786 327 
2011 1670 3082 204 
2012 803 2524 120 
2013 494 1840 89 
2014 453 2390 114 
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Appendix 3 
 
EU-Iran economic relations 
 
Source: Eurostat 
 
Import EU-28 / Iran 
Value (1000 Euro) 
Export EU-28 / Iran 
Value (1000 Euro) 
2002 5623242,92 2002 8313756,12 
2003 6964788,78 2003 10106661,80 
2004 8230061,41 2004 11933419,34 
2005 11538098,94 2005 12993977,28 
2006 14376369,05 2006 11294861,00 
2007 14051610,80 2007 10125422,96 
2008 15941897,34 2008 11340964,04 
2009 9383999,56 2009 10433589,94 
2010 14528476,79 2010 11318512,02 
2011 17328895,30 2011 10497186,67 
2012 5651846,66 2012 7378749,12 
2013 783418,03 2013 5445880,74 
2014 1162024,34 2014 6417981,81 
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Appendix 4 	  
Interview with Joseph Bahout, the 14/05-2015	  	  
P: Peter Johansen Qvist  	  
J: Joseph Bahout	  	  
00:00 
P: well, first of all i just want to ask if it’s okay if I record our conversation?	  	  
J: Yes, yes of course	  	  
P: Great	  	  
J: I am not sure that I can answer all of your questions, because I’m not really specialized in 
European affairs. I can talk more on the French position and more (mumble).	  	  
00:28	  
P: Great, well, lets talk about the interests of the member states are also what we are very 
interested in, so, I think you will be able to answer at least some of it, im sure. Lets just try… 
First of all id like to ask you what, in your opinion, do you see any particular interests that 
France may have in Iran, which you think may somehow very well affect their bargaining, in the 
negotiations?	  	  
 
J: You mean if France have a particular position towards the negotiations?	  	  
01:07 
P: Yeah, exactly, like if they have any interests?	  	  
 
J: In fact, probably, I mean the way France is perceived in this negotiation process is that 
sometimes is not well understood. I mean many think that france is maybe more Quote un quote 
“hawkish”, in these negotiations, they have a tough line. Now what is strange is a series of 
considerations: first of all, is in general the french… lets say… nuclear doctrine in general. Keep 
in mind that apart from __ france is the only country that has nuclear weapon itself, and that it 
has nuclear capacity. This gives france its status on the international stage.	  	  
02:06 – 02:11 Not able to hear what he is saying.	  
 
J: So, france is quite conservative in terms of its doctrine towards nuclear proliferation. It is 
maybe probably more attached than other countries to a strictness towards prolif, because it 
wouldn’t like to see its comparative advantage, let's say, potentially challenged or endangered, is 
one. The second thing is that also, for many reasons, probably because of its greater prox 
towards countries in the middle east and the region, France probably also understand better the 
fears and the suspicions of many actors in the region. Egypt, Israel, or gulf states or the arab 
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states, because also, and this probably the third reason reason, is that france also see that behind 
the nuclear question alone with Iran, there are other questions that have to do with Iran's quote 
unquote “quest for hegemony in the region” and quest for prominence (? 03:18) In the region, 
which is something non-nuclear. It has to do with Iran's behavior in the region and things that 
france is very concerned about, like for example Syria, Lebanon, probably other issues also. So 
for this set of reasons, yes, we can say that france is more hawkish, quote unquote on this issue. 
Now, on these points, sometimes, it coincides with other European countries position, sometimes 
it really differs from them. With Germany for instance, there are many differences. With great 
britain on the contrary, they have some sort of understanding, because both share more or less 
the same approach towards these questions.	  	  
04:15  
P: Okay. Great. You say that they sometimes differ a lot from some of the German approach in 
these negotiations. Could you elaborate a little bit on that?	  	  
 
J: Yeah, probably because of the nuclear differenc. I mean, what was said, Germany is not in the 
same position as France. Second, for an entire set of historical reasons and reasons that has to do 
with the last 2 or decades, Germany has much more let's say… better commercial, economic ties 
with Iran. It gives probably more eagerness to see them resuming soon after the sanctions are 
lifted. Of course, france also have interests in Iran, but let’s say that Germany never really 
stopped as much as it could, good relations with Iran, in terms of commercial sanctions, and even 
in terms of political understanding, Germany or others, so… also this is another difference. If 
you look at other issues in the Middle East, like for ex Syria etc. Also Germany is not exactly on 
the same page as France. France is much tougher towards the Assad regime, It is much more 
lenient towards helping the rebellion in Syria, while Germany is on the contrary speaking inside 
the EU for resumption of contacts with Assad, etc. So there are several differences in approach 
and in vision of things, and the way these countries perceive the international order and perceive 
themselves in this order, and also the question of use of force, military tools etc.	  	  
06:09  
P: Okay, so there are definitely other political aspects than just non-proliferation, in your 
opinion.	  	  
J: Yeah I think it’s much deeper than that.	  	  
06:21	  
P: Yeah, okay. Well, if we look at sort of the power balance or the different roles in these 
negotiations, when we are talking the p5+1. What is your view on this power balance, how 
influential do you see the different p5+1 actors or negotiators?	  
 
J: the problem is that in this p5+1, you have a kind of hierarchy of clusters. Of course you have 
first the two big players which are the US and Russia, that are probably sometimes concerting 
together on this issue. Besides the p5+1, they have their own dialogue. Example yesterday, .. 
Kerry .. (uforståeligt), they talked about Iran in a bilateral manner, which is not exactly the p5+1 
format. And then you have probably the club of the nuclear powers in the p5+1, ie the p5, okay? 
3	  
And then you have the +1, which is the EU, which is also something completely different, 
because it has to take decisions by consent and by unanimity etc. And also, you have something 
which I think, I mean… is known to everyone, that behind this p5+1 Iran negotiation, you have a 
US-Iranian negotiation that is in fact the core of everything, its exactly what is important. On this 
level I think the US takes the national interest of the US into account, much more than a kind of 
consensual position of the p5+1. Now of course, at the end of the process you need the p5, and 
maybe the +1, but mainly the p5, because these sanctions would have to also be lifted in the 
security council. So it needs a kind of p5 consensus. But bottom line, and this is why you get 
confused when you read the details of the negotiations and what is surrounding the negotiations, 
is the fact that largely this is an American-Iranian negotiation. It has to do with nuclear, but also 
has to do with future relations between the US and the region and Iran.	  	  
09:08  
P: Alright. So, I guess that’s in line, somehow, with something I read in one of your articles, with 
some of the French diplomats arguing that the negotiations turned bilateral. So you would agree 
with this critique?	  	  
J: Well I agree, but I mean this is something very natural. Its not something that you can decode 
(?måske). Of course you can say that multilateral coordination between the p5 should be better, 
should be greater. Of course it is wishable, but I mean you can’t also prevent the US from having 
its own (09:47 -uforståeligt). But yes, I understand that the French could see that as a kind of 
breach of the p5 solidarity, let's say.	  	  
10:00	  
P: Yes, okay. Well, if we look at the EU, sort as the high representative and the EU appear in the 
negotiations. We found some, a lot of people arguing the same way that you just did, presenting 
that it is largely the United States and Iran who are the strategic part of the negotiations, but that 
the role of the EU, that they had an equal role, but more as a coordinator or perhaps a mediator, 
because it was their format, but that argument was based on that it was the European format and 
the format is multilateral. But what I am getting from you is, that the important decisions, the 
strategic decisions are actually made, to a large degree, bilaterally? - If I understand you 
correctly.	  
 	  
J: Yes exactly, and this is the entire complication and fragility of this. Is that you have five actors 
within which, i mean within this group you also have IAEA as we said, we have the two supers 
US and Russia, and then you have the rest and then you have the US alone, and then you have 
the collective body the EU, which has to take decisions with 28 members unanimously agreeing 
together. Now it is important because the EU probably has stronger economic and commercial 
ties with Iran, also because part of the sanctions will have to be lifted by the EU, EU sanctions 
on Iran. Also because of the economic web of ties between the EU and the West. The banking 
sanctions are hitting financially Iran, it is something that we have to be very coordinated between 
the US and the EU. So I think that if, to put it positively or to look at it positively, you say that 
there is a kind of a division of labour between the powers, between the US and the EU and the 
rest, the 5+1. But if you want to also look at it critically you say that this is something 
complicating the process and maybe at some point also offering the Iranians much more margin 
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of manoeuvre, to play on the nuances not to say the division or the bad judgement of these 
actors, so, but this is quite classical in negotiations, and in any game of negotiations. But of 
course it is different than having strict bilateral negotiations, where both parties knows exactly 
what their line is respectively, their resources are respectively and their what the bargaining 
power of each one respectively is. Here you are negotiating with someone, and at the same time 
you are looking at your partners, sometimes with suspicion or care or exaggerations you see, so it 
complicates the task of the west in the negotiations. Sometimes can facilitate the task of the 
Iranians in negotiations but that things have with time internalized in the process, and partners 
have with time learned to go beyond that.	  
 	  
14:01	  
P: Do you think that the Iranian negotiators somehow play the field because they are aware of 
this? Do you think they sort of attempt to take advantage of the different actors, the different 
multilateral interests?	  
 	  
J: yes of course they can, they did that at federal level, sometimes they complain about that 
because they say okay are we negotiating with France, are we negotiating with the US, are we 
negotiating with everybody together? Agreeing between yourself, so this is a kind of a difficult 
game, something you have to take into account. It is a systemic constraint in the equation, now 
after all when you look at it respectively I think the [Cant hear what he is saying]. Of course if 
you go back to the episode for example of November 28 I think, okay the French were accused 
of more or less complicated the process and probably delayed it, but after all you look at the end 
result, you see that the is something that was quite positive because it helped reaching probably a 
sequel condition that [Hard to hear]. So after all I think that everyone adapts to that, that in the 
process of course everyone tries to take advantage of these complications and divisions and 
divergence and nuances etc.	  
 	  
15:37	  
P: Well if, in your view at least, how do you see the, if we look at the EU-3, Germany, France 
and the UK. I don't know how much into it you are, but the way that they have been negotiating, 
in this, how do you see their sort of negotiation. Do you see it as coordinated, as sort of you 
know EU countries, or do they act individually?	  
 	  
J: You are talking about France and Great Britain? Specifically these two?	  
 	  
P: Yes specifically these two.	  
 	  
J: Well I think there is a kind of strong coordination between France and the UK probably the 
nuclear aspect of it, because they are nuclear. Probably also because of, I mean Germany does 
not have the same approach to military than France and Britain, because of constraints of 
constitutionally constraints, because of the nature of the country, the history of them etc. Now of 
course the three of them were much more probably coordinating with the aspect of sanctions, the 
aspect of commercial issues, legal issues etc. So you have a variable geometry of the 
negotiations, so depending on the issue, depending on the aspect, depending on the question, you 
bring in this or that actor. Things are more advanced between A and B than B and C and etc. so I 
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don't think you have to put it in a very strict frame, you have to look at it in a kind of dynamic 
and quite let’s say fluctuant aspect. As I said, a geometry variable if you want.	  
 	  
17:36	  
P: Yeah okay, and that would be with, sort of the, who do you think coordinates all this, do they 
do that amongst themselves? It is not the High Representative, or any other EU actors?	  
 	  
J: I’m sorry? Oh you mean, is this done by Brussels?	  
 	  
P: Yes exactly.	  
 	  
J: I think that probably in the first steps they are done bilaterally, and then they are probably 
leveraged or put into the EU tank. Frankly here you asking about a very technical aspect, so I 
don’t know about it, I’m not really in to that.	  
 	  
P: Okay that’s fine. 	  	  
18:27	  
P: If we look at France in particular.. you talked before a little bit about some of the major 
concerns they have with being a nuclear power, do you think you can go a little bit more into 
detail or elaborate about the different concerns and interest they have had, or that they wanted to 
bring to the table in these negotiations?	  	  
J: For example.. yes of course maybe not very public or officially, but France is worried what 
could be the behaviour of Iran and position in the region, for example are they worried about the 
Iranians actions in Iraq, Syria and other situations that have nothing to do with the negotiations. 
But France is worried about the security of some Gulf countries which they have strong ties 
with.. Of course the Americans also have ties and concerns, but I would say that the France is 
more keen to take them into consideration, while the US is only concern about the nuclear and 
strategic aspect.. but not the non nuclear aspects. For example Lebanon is a country that is also 
very important for France, mainly for historical reasons but also because of strategic interest 
because Lebanon and Syria are probably the only strong holds that are left today in the Middle 
East, so they are also concerned by how much for example the lifting of sanctions would affect 
Iran’s position in the region. You see all this is in the back mind of the French negotiators than it 
were in the Americans, who is through all this process is very firm take on the nuclear issues 
than the non nuclear. But of course politically, in reality, the Americans negotiators also concern 
about that, but they didn’t include it to complicate the negotiations even more, while the French 
have this in mind constantly. And also trying to convey something, which is not very much 
accepted by the other players in the negotiations the concerns for the Gulf States and sometimes 
Israel accuses the French of being the spokesman for some of these countries. True or false – I 
don’t know, but this is the perception that we deal with.	  
 	  
21:54	  
P: You said before that this French approach in many ways similar to what the UK have been 
trying to do..	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J:  The UK yes, is traditionally a much better diplomatic collusion with the US and of course 
from being a nuclear power they could understand what France was doing and saying but I think 
also that you have to break it down file by file and question by question because for example the 
case of the Syria where France and UK are more concerned than the US, where in other issues 
the US and the UK have much more in collusion or convergence than with France. So it is file by 
file, but I think that at every project you have several layers of coordination or better 
understanding between the US alone, the US-Russia, the US, UK and France, the UK, France 
and Germany etc. etc. etc. So you have to break it down according to the matter that you are 
discussing.	  
 	  
23:24	  
P: Yeah okay. Do you see any… this have all been very much about the political relations and 
security policy I can tell, which is obviously in a nonproliferation case, do you see any other 
political aspects, I mean what about the economic or…	  	  
J: The economic issues is of course very important, everybody look forward the lifting of the 
sanctions where the market will open, new investment etc. But the at the same time also of 
course everybody know that there will be a competition between P5+1 actors towards the trade 
with Iran. So everybody looks at the others in the starting block, who will run faster or be the 
most effective. Of course these considerations are there, but also you have the distinction 
between the US and the rest of P5 and then the P5+1, because also the Iranians knows very well 
that part of these sanctions are purely US, and within them you have the conventional part and 
the congressional part, you have then the P5 in the Security Council that is another story and you 
have the EU and international sanctions that is another story also. So the Iranians know well that 
if they want to lift all the sanctions they have to take all these actors and interest into account, for 
example you can have the P5 lifting of sanctions and tomorrow if the national administration in 
US changes, you can have new congressional sanctions, so how to articulate that is something 
that the Iranians are very aware of. They both fear that, but also they play on that because they 
know also that commercial and economic competition tomorrow is important for the actors that 
are negotiating today..	  	  
P: Okay. Great, I think that this have been very helpful and we appreciate that you had the time 
to talk with us	  
 	  
[Small talk and end of conversation]	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Appendix 5 
 
The following is an email sent by Catherine Ray, lead spokeswoman of the EEAS, to Michelle 
Pace, the project supervisor. The email was sent on the 12th of may, 2015, and subsequently 
forwarded to the group members. 
 
Dear Michelle, 
 
Thank you for your message and for your students' interest in writing about the EU and the Iran 
nuclear negotiations.  
 
However, in this point of time, when the active negotiations are still ongoing, we are not able to 
give any interviews on this topic. 
On a general note, the High Representative/ Vice-President Federica Mogherini cooperates 
closely with the E3 countries involved in the talks, as well as with all other EU Member States, 
and the European unity has been kept during the talks. 
For further information about the EU's relations with Iran, as well as all recent press releases and 
statements by HRVP Mogherini, please see the Iran country page on the European External 
Action Service website: http://www.eeas.europa.eu/iran/index_en.htm 
 
Best regards, 
 
CATHERINE RAY 
Lead EEAS Spokeswoman 
Foreign and Security Policy (Africa, Americas, Middle East and Gulf countries) 
Humanitarian Aid and Crisis management 
International Cooperation and Development 
European Commission 
Spokesperson's Service 
 
BERL 3/326 
B-1049 Brussels/Belgium 
+32 (0)229 69 921 
+32 (0)498 969 921  
catherine.ray@ec.europa.eu 
Twitter: https://twitter.com/catherineeuspox – http://ec.europa.eu/news 
#teamJunckerEU 
 
 
